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FROM “LAMENTATION AND LITURGY 
TO LITIGATION”: THE HOLOCAUST-ERA 
RESTITUTION MOVEMENT AS A MODEL 
FOR BRINGING ARMENIAN GENOCIDE-
ERA RESTITUTION SUITS IN AMERICAN 
COURTS 
MICHAEL J. BAZYLER* 
The numerous Holocaust restitution civil lawsuits that began to be 
filed in the late 1990s and still continue today have yielded over $8 billion 
in payouts to still-living Holocaust survivors and the heirs of Holocaust 
victims.  The precedent created by the Holocaust restitution movement 
now makes it possible for suits stemming from the material losses during 
the Armenian Genocide likewise to be considered by American courts.  
The Armenian Genocide-era restitution cases filed to date have targeted 
entities that, while allegedly profiting from the Armenian Genocide, 
nevertheless were tangential actors to the genocide.  The next step in the 
burgeoning Armenian Genocide-era restitution movement would be the 
filing of suits against the Republic of Turkey and its state-owned 
enterprises that directly profited from the genocide.  Until recently, suits 
against these foreign sovereign defendants would have been barred by the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).  However, recent decisions by 
the United States Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit interpreting FSIA 
in relation to Holocaust restitution have now made possible, for the first 
time in history, actions against the Republic of Turkey and its state-owned 
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the Holocaust-era suits discussed herein. 
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entities for acts committed during the Armenian Genocide.  This article 
provides a blueprint for such suits. 
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For the first time [the Armenian community] has gone beyond 
lamentation and liturgy to litigation, from picketing and going to 
church every April 24 [the Armenian Day of Remembrance] and 
mourning to taking legal action. 
 . . . . 
Holocaust victims’ heirs showed me the way.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A recurring theme in writings about the Armenian Genocide is the 
focus on efforts to obtain recognition of the genocide from the Republic 
of Turkey.2  One also finds, in some instances, discussion about using 
international and multinational organizations like the United Nations 
and the European Union to seek some form of reparation for the few 
living survivors and the much larger group of descendants of the mass 
murder of Armenians committed in Ottoman Turkey between 1915 and 
1923.3  This Article takes a different approach by focusing on the role of 
United States domestic law in dealing with the Armenian Genocide.  It 
specifically examines the use of American-style civil litigation as an 
 
1. Beverly Beyette, He Stands Up in the Name of Armenians, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2001, 
at E1 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Armenian-American attorney Vartkes 
Yeghiayan, who represented plaintiffs in Armenian Genocide-era restitution suits). 
2. Roger W. Smith, The Armenian Genocide: Memory, Politics, and the Future, in THE 
ARMENIAN GENOCIDE: HISTORY, POLITICS, ETHICS 1, 7 (Richard G. Hovannisian ed., 1992) 
(stating that “Turkey will not acknowledge the genocide, but public recognition of it by other 
countries may go some way toward healing the rage that destroys.”); see also PHILIP HERBST, 
TALKING TERRORISM: A DICTIONARY OF LOADED LANGUAGE OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
77 (2003) (“Turkey does not recognize the 1915 massacre of Armenians as genocide,” but 
instead refers to the genocide as “a tragic civil war initiated by Armenian nationalists”). 
3. See, e.g., SEDAT LAÇINER ET AL., EUROPEAN UNION WITH TURKEY: THE POSSIBLE 
IMPACT OF TURKEY’S MEMBERSHIP ON THE EUROPEAN UNION 66–70 (2005) (discussing 
how Turkey’s non-recognition of the Armenian Genocide presents obstacles to Turkish entry 
into the European Union); Robert Melson, Provocation or Nationalism: A Critical Inquiry 
into the Armenian Genocide of 1915, in THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE IN PERSPECTIVE 61, 81 
n.1 (Richard G. Hovannisian ed., 1986).  Further, “[a]n insightful discussion of the concept 
and of the efforts of the UN to apply the Genocide Convention” focuses on the idea that the 
terms genocide and holocaust are used too casually.  Melson, supra, at 81 n.1 (citing LEO 
KUPER, GENOCIDE: ITS POLITICAL USE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1981); and LUCY S. 
DAWIDOWICZ, THE HOLOCAUST AND THE HISTORIANS (1981)).  However, some scholars 
have suggested that the “term holocaust be reserved for instances of extermination” and that 
“the Armenian [G]enocide of 1915 is one such instance” and, thus, an instance appropriate 
for UN governance.  Id. (referring to Yehuda Bauer, Essay, The Place of the Holocaust in 
Contemporary History, in STUDIES IN CONTEMPORARY JEWRY 201–04 (Jonathan Frankel 
ed., 1984)). 
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instrument for bringing accountability to those public and private 
entities that are still profiting today from the Armenian Genocide. 
The domestic courts of the United States have, so far, been the only 
courts ready to recognize civil suits for monetary damages as 
instruments for remedial action in response to genocide and other 
massive human rights abuses.  The most dramatic use of civil litigation 
for this purpose centers on the genocide of the Jews during World War 
II at the hands of Nazi perpetrators and their accomplices, the event 
known as the Holocaust.4  The Holocaust restitution movement, 
launched in the late 1990s5 in American courts against European 
corporations and governments for their wrongful wartime activities,6 
 
4. Burt Neuborne, Preliminary Reflections on Aspects of Holocaust-Era Litigation in 
American Courts, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 795, 795 (2002).  Neuborne writes, 
 
Aided by diplomatic initiatives by Germany and the United States, and by the 
vigorous support of many political figures and community organizations, 
Holocaust-related litigation in American courts against Swiss, German, Austrian, 
and French corporations over the past six years has resulted in the assemblage of a 
vast pool of assets valued in excess of $8 billion for distribution to Holocaust 
victims around the world. 
Id.; see also Graham O’Donoghue, Precatory Executive Statements and Permissible Judicial 
Responses in the Context of Holocaust-Claims Litigation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1119, 1124–25 
(2006) (“The litigation over Nazi-era claims that ensued in the years following World War II, 
and particularly in the late 1990s, was directed, in part, at returning that which was wrongfully 
taken to its rightful owners.”). 
5. See infra note 6.  See generally MICHAEL MARRUS, SOME MEASURE OF JUSTICE: 
THE HOLOCAUST RESTITUTION CAMPAIGN OF THE 1990S (2009). 
6. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE: THE BATTLE FOR 
RESTITUTION IN AMERICA’S COURTS (2003) (reviewing the various lawsuits against Swiss 
and other European banks, German companies, European insurance companies, and 
museums worldwide arising from looting of Jewish property during World War II); STUART 
E. EIZENSTAT, IMPERFECT JUSTICE: LOOTED ASSETS, SLAVE LABOR, AND THE 
UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF WORLD WAR II 77–78 (2003).  See generally Robert A. Swift, 
Holocaust Litigation and Human Rights Jurisprudence, in HOLOCAUST RESTITUTION: 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE LITIGATION AND ITS LEGACY 50 (Michael J. Bazyler & Roger P. 
Alford eds., 2006) (discussing generally the litigation and history of the Holocaust restitution 
movement from the perspective of its most important actors and observer–scholars). 
 The Holocaust restitution litigation began in 1996 with suits against Swiss banks for 
failure to return asset deposits of Jews with the banks during the Hitler era and for trading 
with Nazi Germany in looted assets, including gold stolen by the Nazis.  EIZENSTAT, supra, at 
78.  It then proceeded with suits against European insurance companies for failure to honor 
Holocaust-era insurance policies.  Id. at 266–68.  Holocaust survivors then filed suits against 
German companies for profiting from slave labor by Nazi victims and related activities.  Id. at 
77.  French and Austrian banks were also sued for persecuting their Jewish customers.  Id. at 
303–08, 319–20.  Finally, museums, galleries, and private collectors were sued for the return of 
art looted by the Nazis from Jewish families that came into the hands of these persons and 
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yielded over $8 billion in payouts as compensation for the monetary 
losses and other injuries suffered by Jews during World War II.7 
This Article proceeds with Part II, which will discuss the successful 
Holocaust restitution litigation.  Part III will analyze the Armenian 
lawsuits filed to date and then set out how the Holocaust restitution 
litigation has been used as a model for the Armenian suits.  Finally, Part 
IV will look to the future and discuss the viability of filing suits against 
the Republic of Turkey, the nation-state itself, and Turkish state-owned 
enterprises doing business in the United States based on the precedents 
created by the Holocaust-era restitution suits and the movement 
established by the settled and ongoing Armenian restitution suits. 
II.  THE HOLOCAUST RESTITUTION LITIGATION 
A.  “As a moth is drawn to light”: Why American Courts? 
The fact that American courts for the last decade have dealt with 
wrongs committed during World War II, “over one-half century after 
the events took place, is astounding.”8  In the history of American 
litigation, until the filing of the Holocaust-era restitution suits, “no class 
 
entities after the war.  See id. at 187–204.  For general discussions about the theft of Jewish 
property during the Nazi-era, see GÖTZ ALY, HITLER’S BENEFICIARIES: PLUNDER, RACIAL 
WAR, AND THE NAZI WELFARE STATE (2008); RICHARD Z. CHESNOFF, PACK OF THIEVES: 
HOW HITLER AND EUROPE PLUNDERED THE JEWS AND COMMITTED THE GREATEST 
THEFT IN HISTORY (2001); and MARTIN DEAN, ROBBING THE JEWS: THE CONFISCATION OF 
JEWISH PROPERTY IN THE HOLOCAUST, 1933–1945 (2010). 
7. America’s Role in Addressing Outstanding Holocaust Issues: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Eur. of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 8 (2007) (statement of 
Hon. J. Christian Kennedy, Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues).  Kennedy stated the 
following: 
 
A combination of court settlements and other U.S.-facilitated agreements resulted 
in over $8 billion for Holocaust victims and their heirs from Swiss banks, German 
companies, Austrian companies, and French banks, as well as several large 
European insurance companies.  Most of these agreements were concluded with the 
participation of European governments and the U.S. Government. 
 As of today, nearly all of the $8 billion from these agreements has been either 
distributed to survivors and heirs or otherwise obligated for continuing programs to 
support needy survivors or promote Holocaust education and remembrance. 
Id. 
8. Michael J. Bazyler, Litigating the Holocaust, THE 1939 CLUB, http://www.1939club. 
com/1939%20Articles-1.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2011) [hereinafter Litigating the Holocaust]. 
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of cases [had] ever appeared in which so much time had passed between 
the wrongful act and the filing of the lawsuit.”9 
The Holocaust did not occur in the United States, but in Europe, 
and most Holocaust survivors reside outside of the United States.10  It is 
the United States legal system, however, that took the lead in delivering 
some measure of long-overdue justice to aging Holocaust survivors.11  
As with all transnational litigation today, the highly-developed and 
expansive system of American justice made the United States the best 
and, in most instances, the only legal forum for the disposition of such 
claims.12 
 
9. Michael J. Bazyler, The Holocaust Restitution Movement in Comparative Perspective, 
20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 11, 11 (2002) [hereinafter Holocaust Restitution Movement]; 
Litigating the Holocaust, supra note 8.  The Holocaust litigation that ensued from the wrongs 
of the Nazi-era has been pursued in American courts decades after such acts occurred.  
Litigating the Holocaust, supra.  These cases represent litigation with the longest window 
between the wrongful act and the pursuit of litigation against such acts.  Id. 
10. Tel Aviv University, United States of America 2000–1, THE STEPHEN ROTH 
INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF CONTEMPORARY ANTISEMITISM AND RACISM, 
http://www.tau.ac.il/Anti-Semitism/asw2000-1/usa.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2011).  The report 
indicates that “Jews of East European origin make up the majority of American Jewry, while 
the United States is also home to the largest number of Holocaust Survivors outside of the 
State of Israel.”  See id.  Amcha provides rehabilitative services to meet the needs of still-
living Holocaust survivors.  See About Us/Amcha’s Mission, AMCHA, http://www.amcha.org 
(last visited Nov. 5, 2011).  According to the site, “[a]bout 200,000 Holocaust survivors live in 
Israel today, many of whom were children during the war.”  Id. 
11. See Arthur Oder, Note, What’s Fair Is Fair? A Comparative Look at Judicial 
Discretion in Fairness Review of Holocaust Era Class Action Settlement in the United States 
and Canada, 17 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 545, 548 (2009).  Because of “the seemingly 
unimaginable victory of the Swiss Banks Settlement, several new Holocaust era class actions 
began to appear in U.S. courts.”  Id.  The litigation that ensued contributed to the United 
States taking the lead in Holocaust-related litigation.  Id.; United States Practice in 
International Law, 2006 DIGEST ch. 8, at 505 (Sally J. Cummins ed.) (describing the American 
interest in Holocaust-related litigation as “an important policy objective of the United States 
to bring some measure of justice to Holocaust survivors and other victims of the Nazi era, 
who are elderly and are dying at an accelerated rate, in their lifetimes”). 
12. Tom McNamara, Special Features of Transnational Litigation in United States 
Courts Presented to: Russian–American Symposium on Private International Law (June 29, 
2004), available at http://apps.americanbar.org/intlaw/committees/disputes/litigation/Trans 
nationallit.pdf. 
 
[T]he American judicial system clearly “has many features that make suit in the 
United States more attractive than in foreign jurisdictions.”  The apparent 
willingness of American courts to entertain foreign-oriented cases has prompted 
considerable comment in legal and foreign policy circles as well as the mass media 
both in the United States and abroad.  A recent headline from the New York Times 
crystallizes the common perception: “U.S. Courts Become Arbiters of Global 
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American courts have a long history of recognizing jurisdiction over 
defendants where courts of other countries would find jurisdiction to be 
lacking.13  American-style discovery, unknown in Europe, allows the 
plaintiff’s lawyers to better develop the case through requests for 
production of documents, requests for admission, and depositions of 
adverse parties and witnesses during the pre-trial process.14  This is in 
contrast to the European system of having all evidence available at the 
outset of litigation.15  The usual guarantee of jury trials in civil cases, 
coupled with a culture where juries are accustomed to granting awards 
in the millions (or even billions) of dollars, both as compensatory and as 
punitive damages, made the filing of a Holocaust-era lawsuit in the 
United States more likely to succeed financially.16  Furthermore, the 
existence of the concept of a “class action,” where representative 
plaintiffs can file suit not only on their own behalf, but also on behalf of 
all others similarly situated, creates a more efficient system of filing suits 
and raises the prospect of large awards against wrongdoers. 
American legal culture has also been a key factor.  American 
attorneys are greater risk-takers than their European counterparts.  
Unlike in most other countries, an American lawyer can take a case on a 
contingency basis, in which the client does not pay if the case is 
unsuccessful but must share a percentage of the award if the case  
  
 
Rights and Wrongs.” 
Id. (quoting Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States and the Organization 
for International Investment as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 5, Hoffman-Laroche, 
Ltd. v. Empagran, S.A., No. 03-724, 2004 WL 220706 (U.S. Feb. 3, 2004)). 
13. See generally Linda J. Silberman & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, A Different Challenge for 
the ALI: Herein of Foreign Country Judgments, an International Treaty, and an American 
Statute, 75 IND. L.J. 635 (2000). 
14. GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN 
UNITED STATES COURTS 907–12 (4th ed. 2007); see also Smith Kline & French Labs. v. 
Bloch, [1983] W.L.R. 730 (A.C.) at 744 (Eng.).  “The broad, party-controlled character of 
U.S. pretrial discovery contrasts sharply with methods for obtaining evidence in many foreign 
countries.”  BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra, at 910.  Discovery in civil law countries is controlled 
by the courts rather than the litigants and takes the power away from the plaintiff’s attorney 
in seeking production of evidence.  Id. at 910–11. 
15. BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 14, at 911–12 (describing that in civil law nations 
the taking of evidence is a judicial function that seeks to prevent attorneys from fishing-
expeditions by keeping evidence available only at the outset of litigation). 
16. See id. at 3–4 (describing the benefits to plaintiffs in U.S. courts, as “U.S. damage 
awards tend to be dramatically larger than those in other countries”). 
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succeeds.17  Moreover, in the United States, a losing party, except in 
unusual cases, does not pay the attorney fees of the successful litigant.18  
The American system thus creates incentives for both attorneys and 
plaintiffs alike, allowing victims to bring claims more often.  The great 
British jurist Lord Denning recognized American courts as the most 
desirable forum for transnational litigation when he wryly observed in 
an English court opinion as follows: “As a moth is drawn to light, so is a 
litigant drawn to the United States.  If he can only get his case into their 
courts, he stands to win a fortune.”19 
New York University law professor Burt Neuborne, one of the lead 
lawyers in the Holocaust restitution suits against the Swiss banks and 
German industries, in response to the question of why an American 
court should hear these suits, explained it this way: 
 
 Why an American court?  Well, why not?  Jurisdiction over 
most of the defendants is not a problem, since very few major 
corporations elect to pass up the opportunity to do substantial 
business in the world’s largest market.  American procedure is 
among the most sophisticated in the world, permitting large 
numbers of similarly situated victims to be represented in class 
actions, and requiring disclosure of relevant corporate records.  
In no other legal system is the playing field so truly level 
between weak and strong. 
 Finally, American courts are not afraid to enforce the bans 
on genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity announced 
by the Nuremberg tribunals as the core of customary 
international law.  We hope to blend sophisticated American 
procedure and humanitarian international law to provide victims 
of the Holocaust with a modicum of legal justice.20 
 
It follows that, based on the jurisdictional expansiveness embraced by 
the American judicial system and the plaintiff-friendly environment 
found in America, American courts present the best, and most often the 
only, forum where suits for historical injustices can be heard. 
 
17. Id. at 3. 
18. Id.  See generally Herbert M. Kritzer, Lawyer Fees and Lawyer Behavior in 
Litigation: What Does the Empirical Literature Really Say?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1943 (2001). 
19. Smith Kline, [1983] W.L.R. at 733. 
20. Burt Neuborne, Making a Case for Victims of the Holocaust, JEWISH J. (Apr. 22, 
1999), http://www.jewishjournal.com/home/searchview.php?id=3508. 
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B.  Symbolic Justice 
In evaluating the successes of the Holocaust restitution suits, it is 
important to remember their limitations.  First, none of these lawsuits 
went to trial.  All ended with settlements; meaning that the victims of 
the Holocaust or their heirs filing these suits never got their day in court. 
Second, some of these suits were initially dismissed on jurisdictional 
grounds.  In some instances, however, even when the European 
defendants won, they did not walk away from the negotiating table but 
continued to negotiate to reach some kind of settlement.  Germany and 
its corporations, for example, realized that they had not only a legal 
dispute on their hands, but also a political dispute and a significant 
public relations problem.21  A legal victory still would not keep (1) 
American politicians from pushing for the Germans to make some kind 
of compensation; and (2) the Holocaust victims and their supporters 
from reminding the American consumer that the German products they 
were buying—whether cars, computers, aspirin, or insurance—were 
from the same companies that were implicated in some of the most 
horrific crimes committed in human history.22 
Third, and finally, while each of the settlements in totality involved 
large sums, including some in the billions of dollars, the individual 
payouts for most survivors and heirs have been small.23  As an example, 
 
21. See BAZYLER, supra note 6, at 74–79. 
22. As Turkey and Turkish state-owned and private enterprises expand their 
commercial presence in the United States, inklings of similar public-awareness campaigns are 
beginning to appear.  For example, in December 2010, state-owned Turkish Airlines 
announced that it hired basketball star Kobe Bryant as its official spokesperson.  In reaction, 
celebrity Kim Kardashian, who is of Armenian descent, mounted a Twitter campaign seeking 
for Bryant to dissociate himself from the airline and even recruited her sister Khloe, who is 
married to Bryant’s teammate Lamar Odom, in her efforts.  Kardashian’s campaign, while 
bringing additional awareness of the Armenian Genocide to the younger generation of 
American consumers and celebrity watchers, ultimately did not convince Bryant himself, who 
continued as the public face of Turkish Airlines under his two-year contract.  See, e.g., 
Benjamin Harvey, Kobe Bryant’s Sponsorship by Turkish Airlines Provokes L.A. Armenians’ 
Ire, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 15, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-12-15/kobe-bryant-
s-sponsorship-by-turkish-airlines-provokes-l-a-armenians-ire.html; Melissa Rohlin, Kobe 
Bryant’s Deal With Turkish Airlines Has Angered Many Armenian Americans, L.A. TIMES: 
LAKERS BLOG (Dec. 16, 2010, 8:49 PM), http://lakersblog.latimes.com/lakersblog/2010/12/ 
kobe-bryants-deal-with-turkish-airlines-has-sparked-protests.html (discussing Bryant’s deal). 
23. Gabriel Schoenfeld, Holocaust Reparations—A Growing Scandal, COMMENTARY, 
Sept. 2000, at 25, 29.  “Actual payments that the Holocaust claimants will receive are 
minuscule (whether $7,500 or $50,000) compared to the personal and financial losses they 
suffered.  The payments made by the corporate wrongdoers will come nowhere close to 
disgorging the profits they made from their dealings with the Nazis or participation in the 
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Holocaust survivors that worked as slaves at Auschwitz for a German 
company under the most horrific conditions—conditions for which the 
German Nazis called the “death-through-work program”24—received a 
one-time payment of approximately $7500 each.25 
At most, we call these payments “symbolic justice.”  Much more 
important than the sums received was the recognition by the 
perpetrators of the wrongs committed against the victims and an 
issuance of an apology to those victims.  As explained by Eva Kor, an 
identical twin experimented upon at Auschwitz by the infamous Dr. 
Mengele, “Even though this is a small amount of money, it is a big help  
  
 
Holocaust.”  Holocaust Restitution Movement, supra note 9, at 41. 
24. 1 OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR PROSECUTION OF AXIS CRIMINALITY, 
NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION 876, 878 (1946). 
 
 The slave labor program was designed to achieve two purposes.  The primary 
purpose was to satisfy the labor requirements of the Nazi war machine by 
compelling foreign workers, in effect, to make war against their own countries and 
its allies.  The secondary purpose was to destroy or weaken peoples deemed inferior 
by the Nazi racialists, or deemed potentially hostile by the Nazi planners of world 
supremacy. 
. . . . 
 The purposes of the slave labor program, namely, the strengthening of the Nazi 
war machine and the destruction or weakening of peoples deemed inferior, were 
achieved by the impressment and deportation of millions of persons into Germany 
for forced labor, by the separation of husbands from their wives and children from 
their parents, and by the imposition of conditions so inhuman that countless numbers 
perished. 
Id. 
25. Transcript of Remarks by Ambassador Stuart E. Eizenstat Before the Austrian 
Parliament in Commemoration of Ten-Year Anniversary of the Washington Agreement 
between the United States and Austria (Jan. 19, 2011), available at http://austria.usembassy. 
gov/eizenstat.html.  As Ambassador Eizenstat remarked: 
 
While the overall amounts seem large (in Austria’s case, including funds from the 
National Fund and our U.S.–Austrian agreement some $1 billion; in Germany’s 
$5 billion), the actual payments to individuals were small.  Slave laborers received a 
one-time payment of roughly $7500 and forced laborers $2500, no more than a 
symbolic payment. And those whose property in Austria was torn from them have 
received a tiny fraction of their actual value.  And all of these payments came only 
over fifty years later.  Nor did the class action lawyers enrich themselves, as some 
believe.  I assured that in the final settlements, they received only about one percent 
of the total amount. 
Id.; see also Restitution of Holocaust Assets: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Banking and 
Fin. Servs., 106th Cong. 15–16 (2000) (discussing some of the concerns of Ambassador 
Eizenstat). 
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to those survivors who are in need of assistance.  And more importantly, 
this shows that Germany has recognized what was done to the victims 
and has not forgotten their suffering.”26  The few remaining Armenian 
victims of the genocide and their heirs, of course, still await such 
recognition and symbolic justice from Turkey. 
III.  USING HOLOCAUST RESTITUTION LITIGATION AS A MODEL FOR 
SEEKING JUSTICE FOR THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE 
A.  Suing the Tangential Actors: Armenian Insurance Litigation 
Attorney Vartkes Yeghiayan, himself a child of survivors of the 
Armenian Genocide, initiated the use of American courts to litigate 
events surrounding the Armenian Genocide.  The Los Angeles Times 
explained Yeghiayan’s motivation in filing such suits as follows: “‘For 
the first time [the Armenian community] has gone beyond lamentation 
and liturgy to litigation,’ from picketing and ‘going to church every 
April 24 [Armenian Day of Remembrance] and mourning’ to taking 
legal action.”27  Paying homage to the Holocaust restitution suits as 
precedent for his actions, Yeghiayan commented, “Holocaust victims’ 
heirs ‘showed me the way.’”28 
By 2008, Yeghiayan and his fellow Southern California attorneys, 
Brian Kabateck and Mark Geragos, had brought several suits in federal 
courts in California against various American and European corporate 
entities for events surrounding the Armenian Genocide.29  Their first 
suit involved insurance. 
 
26. Children of Auschwitz Nazi Deadly Lab Experiments Survivors, CANDLES 
HOLOCAUST MUSEUM, http://www.candlesholocaustmuseum.org/index.php?sid=26 (last 
visited Oct. 12, 2011) (providing background on Eva Kor); Jewish Victims of Nazi Medical 
Experiments to Receive Second Symbolic Payment, CLAIMS CONFERENCE: THE 
CONFERENCE ON JEWISH MATERIAL CLAIMS AGAINST GERMANY (Mar. 8, 2005), 
http://www.claimscon.org/?url=medex/payment2.  
27. Beyette, supra note 1, at E3.  The Armenian Day of Remembrance commemorates 
the arrest and deportation of some 250 Armenian intellectuals of Istanbul on the evening of 
April 24, 1915. 
28. Id. 
29. See Carol J. Williams, Armenian Genocide Victims’ Descendants May Sue, Court 
Rules, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/dec/11/local/la-me-
armenian-genocide-20101211; Dennis Romero, Armenian-American Lawyers, Including Mark 
Geragos, Seek Class-Action Status in Suit Against Turkey, LAWEEKLY: BLOGS (July 30, 
2010, 6:08 AM), http://blogs.laweekly.com/informer/2010/07/armenian-american_turkey.php. 
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During the Turkish Ottoman Empire, Armenians and other 
minorities purchased insurance policies from European and American 
insurance companies, which marketed those policies in the region.30  The 
majority of such purchasers perished in the Armenian Genocide during 
and after World War I.  Their relatives, some of whom survived the 
genocide as young children and were now quite elderly, sought payment 
from the insurers, claiming that the insurance companies never paid the 
beneficiaries of these policies.31  Some even had the original copies of 
these policies, passed down from generation to generation.32 
Perhaps the best known documentation regarding the theft of 
Armenian assets by the Ottoman Turks involved the exchange between 
Henry Morgenthau, American Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, 
and Ottoman leader Mehmed Talaat Pasha.33  During this exchange, 
Pasha requested that Morgenthau ask American insurance companies to 
supply the Ottoman government with a list of their Armenian policy 
holders because the proceeds of the dead Armenians would now escheat 
to the state.34 
In 2000, twelve elderly Armenians, representing a putative class of 
approximately 10,000 persons of Armenian ancestry, brought the first  
  
 
30. See, e.g., Elaine Woo, Martin Marootian Dies at 95; Lead Plaintiff in Suit Over 




33. HENRY MORGENTHAU, AMBASSADOR MORGENTHAU’S STORY 339 (1918).  The 
exchange in Morgenthau’s diary reads as follows: 
 
 One day Talaat made what was perhaps the most astonishing request I had ever 
heard.  The New York Life Insurance Company and the Equitable Life of New 
York had for years done considerable business among the Armenians.  The extent 
to which these people insured their lives was merely another indication of their 
thrifty habits. 
 “I wish,” Talaat now said, “that you would get the American life insurance 
companies to send us a complete list of Armenian policy holders.  They are 
practically all dead now and have left no heirs to collect the money.  It of course all 
escheats to the state.  The Government is beneficiary now.  Will you do so?” 
 This was almost too much, and I lost my temper. 
 “You will get no such list from me,” I said, and I got up and left him. 
Id. 
34. Id. 
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lawsuit filed with regard to these insurance claims against American 
insurance giant New York Life Insurance Company.35  Similar to the 
Holocaust restitution insurance litigation, the claimants sought for New 
York Life to pay on the policies, alleging, among other claims, 
constructive trust, unjust enrichment, breach of good faith and fair 
dealing, and money had and received.36 
New York Life did not dispute that it sold such policies to the 
Armenian population in Ottoman Turkey.37  It argued, however, that 
the suit should be dismissed because all of the policies contained forum-
selection clauses mandating that if a dispute ever arose about the 
policies, the parties would resolve such a dispute either before French or 
English courts.38  In addition, New York Life argued that, since the 
policies were written and allegedly unpaid almost a century ago, the 
lawsuits were time-barred.39 
California, which has the largest population of residents of 
Armenian descent in the United States,40 came to the rescue.  In 2001, 
the California legislature enacted a statute similar to earlier statutes it 
passed in response to the Holocaust-era suits extending the statute of 
limitations period (known in civil law countries as prescription).41  
 
35. Marootian v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., No. CV-99-12073 CAS (MCx), 2001 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 22274, at *2–4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2001). 
36. Id. at *4–5. 
37. Id. at *2, *8 (discussing as an established fact that New York Life sold life insurance 
policies to Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, while New York Life sought to bar these 
claims from court via the forum-selection clause in the contracts). 
38. Id. at *8–9. 
39. Id. at *40–49. 
40. Nicole E. Vartanian, A Fruitful Legacy: Armenian Americans in California, 
COBBLESTONE, May 2000, at 10, 11 (“The United States is now home to more than one 
million Armenians.  Approximately half of this population resides in California, largely in the 
cities of Glendale, Fresno, Los Angeles, and San Francisco.”). 
41. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.4 (West 2006).  Section 354.4 reads as follows: 
 
 (a) The following definitions govern the construction of this section: 
 (1) “Armenian Genocide victim” means any person of Armenian or 
other ancestry living in the Ottoman Empire during the period of 1915 to 
1923, inclusive, who died, was deported, or escaped to avoid persecution 
during that period. 
 (2) “Insurer” means an insurance provider doing business in the state, 
or whose contacts in the state satisfy the constitutional requirements for 
jurisdiction, that sold life, property, liability, health, annuities, dowry, 
educational, casualty, or any other insurance covering persons or property 
to persons in Europe or Asia at any time between 1875 and 1923. 
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California’s Armenian insurance prescription statute did the following: 
(1) allowed suits to collect benefits on Armenian Genocide-era policies 
to be heard in California courts, despite the forum-selection clauses in 
the policies; and (2) extended the limitations period of such suits to 
2010.42  In January 2004, success was achieved when the parties agreed 
to settle the Armenian insurance claims against New York Life for $20 
million.43 
The settlement with New York Life did not end the Armenian 
Genocide insurance litigation.  After the settlement with New York 
Life, a team of lawyers working on this litigation filed, on behalf of 
other Armenian plaintiffs, three additional lawsuits.  The first two class 
action lawsuits were filed against two European insurance companies 
that likewise sold policies to Armenians in Ottoman Turkey: The 
French insurance company AXA44 and the German insurer Victoria 
Insurance.45  Both of these insurance companies had previously been 
sued by Holocaust survivors and heirs for their alleged failure to pay on 
Holocaust-era insurance policies.  The Armenian Genocide heirs’ suits 
against AXA were settled in 2005 for $17.5 million and the first payouts 
 
 (b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any Armenian Genocide 
victim, or heir or beneficiary of an Armenian Genocide victim, who resides in this 
state and has a claim arising out of an insurance policy or policies purchased or in 
effect in Europe or Asia between 1875 and 1923 from an insurer described in 
paragraph (2) of subdivision (a), may bring a legal action or may continue a pending 
legal action to recover on that claim in any court of competent jurisdiction in this 
state, which court shall be deemed the proper forum for that action until its 
completion or resolution. 
 (c) Any action, including any pending action brought by an Armenian 
Genocide victim or the heir or beneficiary of an Armenian Genocide victim, 
whether a resident or nonresident of this state, seeking benefits under the insurance 
policies issued or in effect between 1875 and 1923 shall not be dismissed for failure 
to comply with the applicable statute of limitation, provided the action is filed on or 
before December 31, 2010. 
 (d) The provisions of this section are severable. If any provision of this section 
or its application is held invalid, that invalidity shall not affect other provisions or 
applications that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application. 
Id. 
42. Id. 
43. See Harut Sassounian, Armenian-American Lawyers and Leaders Should Counter 
Ruling of Appeals Court, ARMENIA NEWS BULL. (Armenian General Benevolent Union, 
New York, N.Y.) Aug. 31, 2009, http://agbu.org/newsbulletin/2009-08-0831.pdf. 
44. Complaint, Kyurkjian, v. AXA, No. 2:02-cv-01750-CAS-Mc (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 
2002); Complaint, Ouzounian v. AXA, No. 2:05-cv-02596-CAS-Mc (C.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2005). 
45. Complaint, Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung, No. 2:05-cv-03-9407 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 
23, 2003). 
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from the settlement were made in 2007.46  The suit against Victoria 
Insurance did not fare as well. 
Reverend Father Vazken Movsesian and his fellow Armenian 
plaintiffs brought the third lawsuit in 2003 against Victoria Insurance47 
(represented by its current owner, German insurer Munich Re).48  After 
seven years of winding through procedural motions and appeals, the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals allowed the claims to proceed forward 
on December 10, 2010.49  The Movsesian I class action plaintiffs sued for 
benefits flowing from insurance policies that Victoria Insurance issued 
to their ancestors in Ottoman Turkey at the end of the nineteenth 
century and in the first decade of the twentieth century.50  While the 
statute of limitations normally would have expired for insurance claims 
arising out of contracts dating back to the Armenian Genocide, the 
California Legislature enacted section 354.4 of the California Code of 
Civil Procedure to allow such claims to survive,51 including language as 
specific as “Armenian Genocide victim,” and allowing such victims or 
beneficiaries of insurance policies purchased between 1875 and 1923 to 
bring an action to recover damages.52  However, the passage of the 
 
46. AXA Pays Out to the Descendent of Victims of the Armenian Genocide, ARMENIAN 
GENOCIDE INFORMATION CENTRE (UK) (Nov. 21, 2007), http://www.armenian-
genocide.info/2007/11/axa-pays-out-to-descendants-of-victims.html; Amanda Bronstad, 
Attorneys Ordered to Produce Records in Armenian Genocide Settlement, LAW.COM (MAY 4, 
2011), http://www.law.com/jsp/law/international /LawArticleIntl.jsp?id=1202492829090.  
47. Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG (Movsesian I), 578 F.3d 1052, 1055 (9th Cir. 
2009). 
48. The full name of Munich Re is Munchener Ruckversicherungs–Gesellschaft 
Aktiengesellschaft AG, and it was named as a co-defendant in the case.  Id.  Another 
subsidiary of Munich Re, Ergo Versicherungsgruppe AG, alleged also to have sold insurance 
policies to Armenians in Ottoman Turkey, was named a co-defendant as well.  Id.  
Hereinafter all three defendants will be referred to collectively as “Victoria Insurance.” 
49. Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG (Movsesian II), 629 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2010). 
50. Id. at 904. 
51. Id. at 903–04 (“In 2000, the California legislature enacted Senate Bill 1915 which 
amended California’s Code of Civil Procedure to provide California courts with jurisdiction 
over certain classes of claims arising out of insurance policies that were held by ‘Armenian 
Genocide victim[s]’[, and to] . . . amend[] the Code to extend the statute of limitations for 
such claims until December 31, 2010.”).  In the legislative findings accompanying the statute, 
the California legislature recognized that “during the period from 1915 to 1923, many persons 
of Armenian ancestry residing in the historic Armenian homeland then situated in the 
Ottoman Empire were victims of massacre, torture, starvation, death marches, and exile.  
This period is known as the Armenian Genocide.”  S. 1915, 2000 Leg., § 1(a) (Cal. 2000) 
(emphasis added). 
52. See Movsesian II, 629 F.3d at 904 (quoting CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.4 
(West 2006)). 
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statute (notably introduced in the California legislature as Senate Bill 
No. 1915—for the year when the Armenian Genocide began) did not 
solve the limitations problem for the Armenian plaintiffs in Movsesian I.  
Before the district court, Victoria Insurance argued that the California 
statute was unconstitutional because the state, through this statute, had 
impermissibly encroached on the foreign affairs power of the federal 
government by recognizing the Armenian Genocide.53  In December 
2003, Los Angeles-based federal judge Christina Snyder rejected that 
argument and denied defendant Victoria Insurance’s Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion to dismiss.54   
Victoria Insurance appealed to the Ninth Circuit, where a divided 
panel initially agreed with the defendant insurance company and 
reversed Judge Snyder.  In a 2–1 majority decision, the Ninth Circuit 
held in Movsesian I that the use of the words “Armenian Genocide” in 
section 354.4 provided a basis for the federal foreign affairs power to 
preempt the statute.55  In support of this holding, Judge David R. 
Thompson (in agreement with Judge Dorothy W. Nelson) reasoned that 
section 354.4 conflicted with the policy of the federal executive for the 
United States not to officially recognize the Armenian Genocide.56  The 
Movsesian I decision pointed to three House Resolution bills that 
sought to recognize the Armenian Genocide, all of which were 
denounced by the president during the Clinton and Bush 
Administrations57—and were eventually defeated.  The bills never made 
it to a House vote due to protests by President Bill Clinton and other 
officials in his Administration, and because of protests by Secretary of 
State Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates during 
 
53. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant Munich Re’s Motion to 
Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint at 19, Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, No. 
CV-03-0947 CAS (MCx) (C.D. Cal. June 7, 2007); see also Sinan Kalayolu, Correcting 
Mujica: The Proper Application of the Foreign Affairs Doctrine in International Human Rights 
Law, 24 WIS. INT’L L.J. 1045, 1046 (2007) (“FAD provides that, in the absence of a treaty or 
federal statute, a state may still violate the U.S. Constitution by passing a law that 
impermissibly intrudes upon the federal government’s power over foreign affairs.”). 
54. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant Munich Re’s Motion to 
Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint, supra note 53, at 28–29, 37. 
55. Movsesian I, 578 F.3d 1052, 1053, 1062 (9th Cir. 2009). 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 1057–59.  The three defeated House resolutions were (1) Affirmation of the 
United States Record on the Armenian Genocide Resolution, H.R. Res. 596, 106th Cong. 
(2000); (2) H.R. Res. 193, 108th Cong. (2003); and (3) Affirmation of the United States 
Record on the Armenian Genocide Resolution, H.R. Res. 106, 110th Cong. (2007). 
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the George W. Bush Administration.58  Specifically, the letters during 
both Administrations urged against American recognition of the 
Armenian Genocide out of concern for the harm it might cause to 
American foreign relations with Turkey, a longstanding American ally 
in its “global war on terror.”59  The Movsesian I panel concluded that 
these letters and negotiations between the Executive Branch and 
Congress clearly established the “emergence of an express federal 
policy” against recognition of the Armenian Genocide.60  Additionally, 
the panel found that section 354.4 poses a threat to the Executive 
Branch’s diplomatic relations with Turkey and that the state statute 
conflicted with the President’s power to speak for the nation with one 
voice.61 
Judge Harry Pregerson issued a spirited dissent, arguing that the use 
of the term “Armenian Genocide” in section 354.4 does not ipso facto 
make the statute unconstitutional.62  The Movsesian appellants filed 
petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc.63  After no word for 
 
58. Movsesian I, 578 F.3d at 1057–61. 
59. Id. at 1059; see also Alan O. Makovsky, Turkey, in THE PIVOTAL STATES: A NEW 
FRAMEWORK FOR U.S. POLICY IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 88, 93–94 (Robert Chase et al. 
eds., 1999).  Makovsky noted, 
 
The case for Turkey’s regional “pivotalness” is straightforward.  From the time 
it joined NATO in 1952 until the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, Turkey . . .  
presided over one of the world’s key choke points . . . . 
In the Middle East, Turkey was an important ally for the United States during 
the 1991 gulf war. . . .  U.S. bombers were granted permission to launch raids on 
Iraq from Incirlik Air Force base in southern Turkey. 
Makovsky, supra, at 93–94.  For further elaboration, see NASUH USLA, TURKISH FOREIGN 
POLICY IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD 57–58 (2004).  Usla provided the following 
description: 
 
The post-Cold War period have [sic] witnessed an extraordinary increase in 
Turkey’s importance in the eyes of American politicians and strategists.  Turkey is 
now at the center of a new phenomenon, which has important meanings for the 
United States: the emergence of new security areas or new alliances in critical 
regions. 
. . .  The Turkish cooperation with and support for Israel, America’s crucial ally in 
the region, is indispensable from the American point of view. 
Id. 
60. Movsesian I, 578 F.3d at 1060. 
61. Id. at 1062. 
62. Id. at 1063 (Pregerson, J., dissenting). 
63. See Movsesian II, 629 F.3d 901, 903 (9th Cir. 2010) (identifying that the petition was 
filed); Order Requiring Defendant-Appellant to File a Response to Plaintiff-Appellees’ 
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over a year from the Ninth Circuit on the petition, the same Movsesian 
panel on December 10, 2010, issued a new decision announcing a 
dramatic turnaround.64  In Movsesian II, the panel, in a new majority 
decision by Judge Pregerson, found section 354.4 to be constitutional.65  
The change was due to a reconfiguration of how the three panel judges 
voted.  This time, Judge Nelson voted with Judge Pregerson, forming a 
new majority, with Judge Thompson in dissent. 
The Movsesian II decision succinctly summarized at the outset why 
section 354.4 is constitutional: 
 
The primary issue in this appeal is whether § 354.4 conflicts with 
a clear, express federal executive policy.  We conclude that there 
is no express federal policy forbidding states to use the term 
“Armenian Genocide,” and we affirm the district court.66 
 
It is notable that in upholding the constitutionality of section 354.4, the 
new majority distinguished its facts from those encountered by the 
United States Supreme Court in an earlier Holocaust restitution case: 
American Insurance Association v. Garamendi.67  In Garamendi, the 
Supreme Court, in a 5–4 decision, held that a California statute 
mandating that insurance companies doing business in California make 
public any information about Holocaust-era policies issued by them in 
pre-war Europe amounted to an unconstitutional encroachment of the 
federal foreign affairs power.68  According to the Garamendi majority, 
such a state mandate conflicted with executive agreements signed by 
President Clinton with Germany (along with pronouncements by 
presidential officials) to fully and finally conclude all Holocaust-era 
restitution claims, including insurance claims, with Germany and all 
 
Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, Movsesian II, 929 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 
Oct. 23, 2009) (No. 07-56722) (same). 
64. Movsesian II, 629 F.3d at 903.  The petition was granted with respect to a rehearing 
en banc during the publication of this Article.  Order Granting Petition for Rehearing En 
Banc, Movsesian II, 629 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. Nov. 7, 2011) (No. 07-56722), 2011 WL 5336269. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003).  To date, two Holocaust 
restitution cases have reached the Supreme Court.  In addition to Garamendi, involving 
Holocaust-era insurance, the Court in 2004 heard a Nazi looted-art case: Republic of Austria 
v. Altmann (Altmann III), 541 U.S. 677, 680 (2004).  See infra text accompanying note 196. 
68. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 415–17. 
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German entities, public and private.69  With regard to the presidential 
policy on the Armenian Genocide, however, the Movsesian II majority 
found that there was no such formal executive agreement.70 
According to the new majority: 
 
In Garamendi, the Court found that several executive 
agreements, coupled with statements from executive branch 
officials, constituted an express federal policy.  Here, in contrast, 
there is no executive agreement regarding use of the term 
“Armenian Genocide.” 
 Instead, . . . [all we have are] informal presidential 
communications as the sole source of a clear, express federal 
policy against use of the term “Armenian Genocide.”71 
 
As the new majority decision noted, “[N]ot every executive action or 
pronouncement constitutes a proper invocation of that potentially 
preemptive [foreign] policy-making power.”72 
Moreover, the new majority held that any pronouncements by the 
various presidential administrations that did not recognize the events of 
1915–1923 as a genocide were contradicted by presidential 
pronouncements to the contrary: “The three cited executive branch 
communications arguing against recognition of the Armenian Genocide 
are counterbalanced, if not outweighed, by various statements from the 
federal executive and legislative branches in favor of such recognition.”73  
These statements were all issued on or around April 24 and so meant to 
mark the Day of Remembrance of the Armenian Genocide.  First, in 
1981, President Reagan explicitly stated, “Like the genocide of the 
Armenians before it, and the genocide of the Cambodians which 
followed it—and like too many other persecutions of too many other 
people—the lessons of the Holocaust must never be forgotten.”74  
Second, in 1998, President Clinton publicly commemorated “the 
deportations and massacres of a million and a half Armenians in the  
  
 
69. Id. at 405–07, 414–20. 
70. Movsesian II, 629 F.3d at 906. 
71. Id. (citing Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 415). 
72. Id. (citing Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 531–32 (2008)). 
73. Id. at 906. 
74. Proclamation No. 4838, 3 C.F.R. 25 (1981) (emphasis added). 
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Ottoman Empire in the years 1915–1923.”75  Then, in 2009, President 
Obama publicly remembered “the 1.5 million Armenians who were . . . 
massacred or marched to their death in the final days of the Ottoman 
Empire.  The Meds Yeghern76 must live on in our memories, just as it 
lives on in the hearts of the Armenian people.”77 
On the legislative side, while the U.S. Senate never made statements 
about the Armenian Genocide, the House of Representatives has done 
so in two resolutions: (1) in 1975, the House observed “a day of 
remembrance for all victims of genocide, especially those of Armenian 
ancestry”;78 and (2) in 1984, the House recognized “victims of genocide, 
especially the one and one-half million people of Armenian ancestry.”79  
 
75. Message on the Observance of Armenian Remembrance Day, 1998, 1 PUB. PAPERS 
617, 617 (Apr. 24, 1998) (emphasis added). 
76. The Armenian term Meds Yeghern, meaning “great calamity,” is commonly used to 
describe the “Armenia Genocide.”  Ben Schott, Schott’s Vocab: Meds Yeghern, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 6, 2009), http://schott.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/06/meds-yeghern/. 
77. Presidential Statement of President Barack Obama on Armenian Remembrance 
Day (Apr. 24, 2009) (emphasis added).  Moreover, during his presidential campaign, 
candidate Obama asserted on the Senate floor that “[i]t is imperative that we recognize the 
horrific acts carried out against the Armenian people as genocide.”  154 CONG. REC. S3438-
01 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 2008) (statement of Sen. Barack Obama).  Notably, President Obama’s 
failure to use the G-word in English, making reference to it only in the Armenian language, 
was criticized by many in the Armenian-American community in light of his prior campaign 
pledge.  See Huma Khan, Despite Campaign Pledge, President Obama Refuses to Use Word 
‘Genocide’ When Describing the Slaughter of Armenians, ABCNEWS.COM (Apr. 24, 2009, 2:26 
PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2009/04/despite-campaig/.  On April 24, 2010, 
President Obama likewise used euphemisms rather than the G-word: 
 
 On this solemn day of remembrance, we pause to recall that 95 years ago, one of 
the worst atrocities of the 20th century began.  In that dark moment of history, 1.5 
million Armenians were massacred or marched to their death in the final days of 
the Ottoman Empire. 
 Today is a day to reflect upon and draw lessons from these terrible events.  I 
have consistently stated my own view of what occurred in 1915, and my view of that 
history has not changed.  It is in all of our interest to see the achievement a full, 
frank, and just acknowledgment of the facts.  The Meds Yeghern is a devastating 
chapter in the history of the Armenian people, and we must keep its memory alive 
in honor of those who were murdered and so that we do not repeat the grave 
mistakes of the past. 
 Even as we confront the inhumanity of 1915, we also are inspired by the 
remarkable spirit of the Armenian people . . . . 
 Today, we pause with them and with Armenians everywhere to remember the 
awful events of 1915 . . . . 
Presidential Statement on Armenian Remembrance Day (Apr. 24, 2010) (emphasis added). 
78. H.R.J. Res. 148, 94th Cong. (1975) (emphasis added). 
79. H.R.J. Res. 247, 98th Cong. (1984) (emphasis added). 
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Moreover, some forty states, including California, have issued 
statements recognizing the Armenian Genocide, and the federal 
government never expressed any opposition to such recognitions.  In 
light of these facts, the new majority decision concluded as follows: 
 
 Considering the number of expressions of federal executive 
and legislative support for recognition of the Armenian 
Genocide, and federal inaction in the face of explicit state 
support for such recognition, we cannot conclude that a clear, 
express federal policy forbids the state of California from using 
the term “Armenian Genocide.”80 
 
In addition to finding no actual conflict preemption, Judge 
Pregerson also considered whether field preemption81 would make the 
California statute unconstitutional.  He found that it did not.  Neither 
Congress nor the Executive had preempted the field covered by the 
statute because “California’s attempt to regulate insurance [through 
section 354.4] clearly falls within the realm of traditional state 
interests.”82 
 
80. Movsesian II, 629 F.3d 901, 907 (9th Cir. 2010). 
81. Thomas W. Merrill provides the following definition of field preemption: 
 
[Field preemption] applies when “federal law so thoroughly occupies a legislative 
field ‘as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States 
to supplement it.’”  The idea here is that if federal law is sufficiently comprehensive 
so as to constitute a complete code of regulation, then the court will attribute an 
intention to Congress to displace state law. 
Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 739 
(2008). 
82. Movsesian II, 629 F.3d at 907.  In the quote below, Judge Thompson criticized the 
majority and stated that field preemption did indeed apply here because California, though 
purportedly aiming to regulate insurance (traditionally a subject left to the states), had a 
hidden aim in enacting section 354.4—to conduct foreign policy: 
 
In this case, even though § 354.4 purports to regulate the insurance industry, its real 
purpose is to provide relief to the victims of “Armenian Genocide.” . . .  In short, 
§ 354.4 is California’s attempt to provide relief to a specific category of claimants 
who were aggrieved by a foreign nation, not a general attempt to regulate the 
insurance industry.  While this may be a commendable goal, it is not an area of 
“traditional state responsibility,” and the statute is therefore subject to a field 
preemption analysis. 
Id. at 910–11 (Thompson, J., dissenting). 
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The Movsesian II decision provides a significant victory to the 
burgeoning Armenian Genocide-era restitution movement.  Any 
restitution claims for material losses arising out of the mass destruction 
of the Armenian community in Ottoman Turkey and the concomitant 
theft that took place in the first two decades of the twentieth century 
necessarily confront the problem that such claims might be time-barred.  
If this problem can be remedied by the passage of a state law that 
(1) explicitly recognizes such claims under state law and (2) extends the 
limitations period for such claims to a future date, state courts applying 
such law—and federal courts doing likewise under diversity jurisdiction 
procedural rules—now can examine their claims on their merits rather 
than dismissing them for lack of timeliness.  That California is ready to 
hear such claims was confirmed in 2010 when State Assemblyman Mike 
Gatto authored a bill that would increase the statute of limitations until 
2016.  The Governor of California signed the bill and the California 
legislature extended the limitations period of section 354.4 (and its sister 
statute, section 354.4583) from 2010 to 2016.84 
B.  Suing the Tangential Actors Redux: The German Banks 
In 2006, Yeghiayan and his co-counsel filed a new suit against the 
German banks Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank, seeking to recover 
money and property allegedly withheld by these defendants during the 
Armenian Genocide from their Armenian depositors.85  The German 
banks were also accused of trading in assets stolen from the Armenian 
victims by the Ottoman Turkish state perpetrators.86  The complaint in 
the action initially recited the historical facts of the murder and 
deportation of the Armenian population of Ottoman Turkey, including 
the death of 1.5 million to 2 million Armenians between 1915 and 1923.87  
 
83. For discussion of CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.45 (West 2006), see infra notes 126–
41 and accompanying text. 
84. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.4(c) (West 2006) (action “shall not be dismissed for 
failure to comply with the applicable statute of limitation, provided the action is filed on or 
before December 31, 2010”); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.45 (similar language used); 
§ 354.5(c) (using nearly-identical language); see also Harut Sassounian, California to Extend 
Until 2016 Deadline to Sue Insurance Companies, ARMENIAN WKLY. (Mar. 31, 2011), 
http://www.armenianweekly.com/2011/05/31/california-to-extend-until-2016-deadline-to-sue-
insurance-companies/. 
85. Deirmenjian v. Deutsche Bank, A.G. (Deirmenjian III), No. CV 06-00774 MMM 
(CWx), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86957, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 30, 2010). 
86. Id. at *2, *21–23. 
87. Id. at *7–8.  As the Deirmenjian III court explained, 
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The bulk of the complaint, however, focused not on the extermination 
of the Armenians but on the theft of the victims’ property.88  As the 
Holocaust has so aptly demonstrated, part and parcel to every genocide 
is not only murder but also massive theft of the victims’ assets.89  The 
Armenian Genocide likewise contains this characteristic. 
The filing of the suit against the two German banks marked an 
important step in closing in on the circle of perpetrators and 
beneficiaries of the Armenian Genocide.  In the claims by the Armenian 
heirs against the insurance companies, the Armenian Genocide played a 
tangential role in the litigation; in contrast, the instant action accused 
the German banks of being directly involved in the theft of the assets of 
the Armenians during the genocide.90  While literature on the murder 
and deportation of the Armenians is voluminous and well-
documented,91 discussion of the theft of the property of the Armenians 
still awaits a thorough study.92 
 
 
 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, many ethnic Armenians 
lived in the Ottoman Empire.  Plaintiffs allege that in 1910, shortly after coming to 
power, a regime known as the Young Turks began to “cleanse” the Ottoman 
Empire of all non-Turks, including ethnic Armenians.  Plaintiffs assert that, initially, 
the Young Turks “deported and relocated” Armenians from population centers to 
the deserts of Syria.  They contend that, when World War I erupted, however, the 
Young Turks launched a systematic campaign to deport and kill ethnic Armenians.  
Specifically, plaintiffs assert that, while ostensibly continuing its “deportation and 
relocation” program, the government issued a secret directive ordering the military 
to exterminate all males under fifty, soldiers, priests, and teachers of Armenian 
ethnicity.  Women and children were to be Islamized.  Plaintiffs maintain that, 
between April 1915 and 1923, an estimated 1.5 million to 2 million Armenians were 
killed.  This period has come to be known as the Armenian Genocide. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
88. Id. at *3 (explaining the theories on which plaintiffs sought recovery). 
89. DONALD BLOXHAM, THE FINAL SOLUTION: A GENOCIDE 41 (2009).  There have 
been material motivations and benefits from genocide.  Id.  “[B]yproducts like property theft 
from the victims were an important means of further binding the beneficiaries to each other 
and the regime” despite the primary goals, which were to “remov[e] ‘problem’ groups while 
simultaneously sharpening and rendering more exclusive the identity of the majority.”  Id. 
90. Deirmenjian I, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86957, at *2, *9–20.  “Plaintiffs assert that the 
banks ‘concealed and prevented’ the recovery of assets that were deposited in accounts with 
‘Old Deutsche Bank’ and ‘Old Deutsche Orientbank’ by Armenians prior to the First World 
War and the Armenian Genocide.”  Id. at *2. 
91. See generally TANER AKÇAM, A SHAMEFUL ACT: THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE AND 
THE QUESTION OF TURKISH RESPONSIBILITY (2006) (showing recent studies on the 
Armenian Genocide); DONALD BLOXHAM, GREAT GAME OF GENOCIDE: IMPERIALISM, 
NATIONALISM, AND THE DESTRUCTION OF THE OTTOMAN ARMENIANS (2005). 
92. For discussions of theft during the Armenian Genocide, see UUR ÜMIT ÜNGÖR & 
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The Deirmenjian suit focused on the alleged role of the German 
banks as conduits for the theft of the Armenians’ assets.93  The 
allegations eerily paralleled those cases involving theft of Jewish 
property during the Holocaust and the role of Swiss and German 
financial institutions in facilitating such theft.  In fact, the same two 
German banks were sued by Jewish victims of Nazism and their heirs, 
who alleged that Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank colluded with the 
Nazi regime to steal from Jews in Europe and profited from those 
dealings.94  Procedurally, the suit against the German banks followed the 
model of the Holocaust restitution suits by proceeding as a class action.  
Varoujan Deirmenjian and his six fellow plaintiffs did not sue just on 
their own behalf but also on behalf of all other similarly situated heirs of 
Armenian victims.95  All seven plaintiffs are American citizens and are 
grandchildren of the Armenian victims of the genocide.96 
The complaint in Deirmenjian alleged that the Armenian minority in 
Ottoman Turkey relied on the stability of the European banks and, 
therefore, deposited assets in such banks for their protection.97  The two 
German banks, operating in Ottoman Turkey under the name of 
Deutsche Orient Bank, allegedly had over a dozen branches throughout 
the Ottoman Empire and targeted affluent Armenians as their 
customers.98  With the onset of the killings and deportations of 
 
MEHMET POLATEL, CONFISCATION AND DESTRUCTION: THE YOUNG TURK SEIZURE OF 
ARMENIAN PROPERTY (2011) (discussing theft of Armenian property); HRAYR S. 
KARAGUEUZIAN & YAIR AURON, A PERFECT INJUSTICE: GENOCIDE AND THEFT OF 
ARMENIAN WEALTH (2010); Dickran Kouymjian, Confiscation and Destruction: A 
Manifestation of the Genocidal Process, ARMENIAN F., Autumn 1998, at 1, 1–2; and Dickran 
Kouymjian, Professor, Sonoma State Univ., Lecture at Sonoma State Univ. Holocaust 
Lecture Series: When Does Genocide End? The Armenian Case (Mar. 11, 2003), available at 
http://www.ancsf.org/files/essaysanalysis /When_Does_Genocide_End.pdf.  
93. Deirmenjian I, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86957, at *9–20 (focusing on the banks role 
and involvement in the Genocide claims and its post-Genocide responsibility to its insurers). 
94. See Christopher Simpson, Introduction to WAR CRIMES OF THE DEUTSCHE BANK 
AND THE DRESDNER BANK: OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT (U.S.) REPORTS 1, 1 
(Christopher Simpson ed., 2002) (studying the German Bank activities during the Nazi era); 
HAROLD JAMES, DEUTSCHE BANK AND THE NAZI ECONOMIC WAR AGAINST THE JEWS: 
THE EXPROPRIATION OF JEWISH-OWNED PROPERTY 57–59, 63 (2006). 
95. Deirmenjian I, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86957, at *2. 
96. Id. at *8–9, *12, *15, *17, *19. 
97. First Amended Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 7, 
Deirmenjian v. Deutsche Bank, No. CV 06-0774 MMM (RCx) (C.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2006) 
[hereinafter Deirmenjian Complaint]. 
98. Id. ¶¶ 12–13.  Similar allegations were made against the Swiss banks: Jews fearing 
the troubled times after Hitler’s rise to power and as a result of historic anti-Semitism in 
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Armenians, the German banks allegedly accepted gold deposits from 
the Ottoman Turkish government with full knowledge that such 
deposits were taken from the Armenian victims.99  Moreover, the 
German banks allegedly transferred to their own books assets belonging 
to their deceased Armenian customers rather than returning those 
assets to the customers’ heirs, and they deliberately concealed the 
existence of the deposits from such heirs.100 
Plaintiffs divided themselves into two classes: Class A plaintiffs were 
designated as “[t]he rightful owners of monies and other properties 
deposited by individuals of Armenian descent between 1875 and 1915 in 
the [defendant banks’] offices located in Ottoman Turkey, whose 
property had not been returned”;101 and Class B plaintiffs were 
designated as “[t]he rightful owners of looted assets forcibly taken by 
the government of the Ottoman Turkish Empire after 1875 and 
deposited with the [defendants], whose property had not been 
returned.”102 
As noted above, what differentiates the suit against the German 
banks from the earlier litigation against the insurance companies is that 
the defendants targeted in this suit allegedly participated directly in the 
theft portion of the Armenian Genocide and colluded directly with the 
Ottoman Turkish authorities in such theft.103  The defendant insurers in 
the earlier litigation had no involvement in the genocide, but merely had 
issued policies to individuals who perished in the genocide.  The 
Deirmenjian suit, therefore, seeks to replicate the success of the 
Holocaust restitution litigation by (1) utilizing the U.S. judicial 
procedural mechanism of a class action; (2) targeting foreign 
multinational corporations that do extensive business within the United 
States; (3) alleging wrongful acts committed by these defendants outside 
 
Europe deposited moneys in Swiss banks for protection and privacy.  See BAZYLER, supra 
note 6, at 43, 52 
99. Deirmenjian Complaint, supra note 97, ¶ 35; cf. BAZYLER, supra note 6, at 26 
(explaining that in the Holocaust restitution litigation, both Swiss banks and German banks 
were accused of knowingly accepting from the Nazis gold and other assets looted from the 
Jews). 
100. Deirmenjian Complaint, supra note 97, ¶ 37; cf. BAZYLER, supra note 6, at 43, 66–
67 (explaining that, in a similar vein, the Swiss banks were accused of keeping assets 
deposited for safekeeping by their Jewish customers who perished during the Holocaust; a 
similar allegation was made against the German banks). 
101. Deirmenjian Complaint, supra note 97, ¶ 6.a. 
102. Id. ¶ 6.b. 
103. See supra notes 90–93 and accompanying text. 
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the United States that helped to facilitate theft from a targeted victim 
group during a genocide; and (4) alleging acts committed decades 
earlier. 
In 2006, plaintiffs scored a major victory in the litigation when Los 
Angeles-based federal judge Margaret Morrow, presiding over the 
litigation, denied the banks’ motion to dismiss the class action.104  
According to the banks’ motion, the case should have been dismissed at 
the outset on three major procedural grounds.105  First, the banks raised 
the procedural defense of forum non conveniens, the judicially-created 
doctrine that directs courts to dismiss a suit over which it has jurisdiction 
when a variety of public and private interest factors call for dismissal of 
the suit in the United States in favor of another forum.106  The German 
banks sought for the case to be litigated before German courts despite 
the fact that they conceded they did sufficient business in the United 
States and, specifically, in California, for a court in California to exert 
personal jurisdiction over them.107  Nevertheless, they contended that 
the case should be tried in Germany where the banks were 
headquartered and where any records of their business in the Ottoman 
Empire would be located.108 
Second, the banks argued that in order for an American court to 
determine the merits of plaintiffs’ case, the court would be required to 
judge the validity of the Ottoman government’s decrees involving the 
alleged expropriation of the property of the Armenians.109  This 
predicate to the resolution of the suit implicated the act of state 
doctrine, another judicially-created doctrine that calls for American 
judges to abstain from deciding cases when they must pass on the 
validity of the acts of foreign states.110  Finally, the banks claimed that 
the suit was barred by the statute of limitations since it involved acts 
 
104. Deirmenjian v. Deutsche Bank, A.G. (Deirmenjian I), No. CV 06-00774 MMM 
(CWx), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96772, at *150–51 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2006). 
105. Id. at *5 & n.8. 
106. Id. at *12–15.  See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 14, at 347, for a definition of the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens: “Forum non conveniens is a common law doctrine that 
permits a court to decline to exercise judicial discretion if an alternative forum would be 
substantially more convenient or appropriate.”  Further, central to the “forum non 
conveniens doctrine is a ‘weighing’ of ‘private’ and ‘public’ interest factors” that have been set 
forth by the United States Supreme Court.  Id. at 387. 
107. Deirmenjian I, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96772, at *5, 12. 
108. Id. at *16, *44–45. 
109. Id. at *69–76. 
110. Id. at *69–71. 
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that allegedly took place ninety years ago.111  Therefore, any prescription 
period had long ago expired. 
In a lengthy opinion, the court rejected each of these arguments.  
With regard to the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the court found 
that even though German courts were capable of resolving this suit, 
because plaintiffs were all American citizens the court would not disturb 
the American plaintiffs’ choice of an American forum.  As the court 
explained, “[An American] plaintiff need not select the optimal forum 
for his claim, but only a forum that is not so oppressive and vexatious to 
the [foreign] defendant ‘as to be out of proportion to plaintiff’s 
convenience.’”112  Here, California was not considered such an 
inconvenient forum for the German bank defendants.113  Interestingly, 
factors cited by the court to allow the suit to proceed in California 
included the local interests in the Armenian-American population and 
the resolution of these claims.114  As the court explained, roughly 1.5 
million Armenians reside in the United States, 800,000 of whom live in 
California.115  “In fact, California is home to the largest population of 
Armenians in the world outside of the Republic of Armenia.”116 
In deciding whether to dismiss the suit against the German banks on 
the basis of the act of state doctrine, the court initially acknowledged 
that the case appeared to come within the doctrine by requiring an 
American court to decide the validity of acts of a foreign government 
committed within its own territory.  The court noted as follows: 
 
[R]esolution of this action—or at least some of plaintiffs’ 
claims—in plaintiffs’ favor would require a declaration that the 
Ottoman Empire’s acts and decrees were invalid.  Stated 
differently, in order for the court to conclude that defendants 
wrongfully converted Armenians’ assets, it would first have to 
find that the Young Turks’ confiscation of the assets was invalid 
and that the assets rightfully belonged to plaintiffs’ ancestors.  
Thus, although the Ottoman Empire is not a named defendant, it 
 
111. Id. at *109. 
112. Id. at *68 (internal citations omitted). 
113. Id. at *69. 
114. Id. at *62–63. 
115. Id. at *57. 
116. Id.  
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is clear that certain acts of that government, performed within its 
own territory, are at issue in the case.117 
 
The court nevertheless did not abstain from deciding the action on 
the grounds of the act of state doctrine.118  It first noted that the lawsuit 
did not ask the court to become enmeshed in the political debate over 
whether to label the massacres of the Armenians as “genocide.”119  
Moreover, the United States Department of State had not stated that it 
was opposed to this litigation.  As Judge Morrow explained, “This 
lawsuit . . . challenges the Young Turks’ expropriation of Armenian 
assets; whatever its outcome, it will not require the Executive Branch to 
condemn the Armenian Genocide.  Nothing in the proceedings . . . 
indicates that the State Department would oppose adjudication of this 
action.”120 
The German banks third argument was that the suit be dismissed 
because the period of prescription had expired.121  On first blush, the 
prescription, or statute of limitations, defense appeared to be the 
German banks’ strongest argument.  As noted earlier, such claims 
alleging wrongful acts occurring over ninety years ago would no longer 
be actionable today, at least not ordinarily.122  California, however, has a 
law on its books—California Code of Civil Procedure section 348, which 
dates back to 1873—stating that there is no limitation on “actions 
brought to recover money or other property deposited with any 
bank.”123  Because lead plaintiff Deirmenjian and his fellow Class A 
 
117. Id. at *75–76. 
118. Id. at *93–94. 
119. Id. at *91. 
120. Id. at *91–92. 
121. Id. at *109–10. 
122. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 338 (West 2006) (stating the ordinary statute of 
limitations for a civil action is three years).  Unlike serious domestic felonies such as murder, 
or severe international crimes like genocide, or crimes against humanity, for which no statute 
of limitations period is recognized and the wrongdoer defendant can always be criminally 
prosecuted, civil suits traditionally have a time period during which the suit against the 
defendant must be brought.  Compare id., with CAL. PENAL CODE § 799 (West 2008) (stating 
there is no statute of limitations for crimes punishable by death, life imprisonment, or 
embezzlement of public money). 
123. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 348 (West 2006).  The statute provides that 
 
 To actions brought to recover money or other property deposited with any 
bank, banker, trust company, building and loan association, or savings and loan 
society or evidenced by a certificate issued by an industrial loan company or credit 
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plaintiffs sought the return of funds deposited by their ancestors in the 
Deutsche Orient Bank, Judge Morrow found, applying the broad 
language of section 348 quoted above, that their deposited assets claims 
were not time-barred.124 
The Class B plaintiffs, with Raffi Bakian as their class 
representative, did not fare as well.  Since the no-limitations rule of 
section 348 did not apply to Class B’s looted assets claims, Judge 
Morrow dismissed these claims as untimely.125  However, Judge Morrow 
allowed Class B plaintiffs to file another amended complaint to 
demonstrate that they could somehow avoid the applicability of the 
statute of limitations by showing that, on principles of equity, the statute 
of limitations should be tolled or the German banks should be estopped 
from asserting the statute.126 
Bakian and his fellow Class B plaintiffs did file such an amended 
complaint.  This time, however, they based their argument for their 
looted assets claims as still being ripe not solely on principles of equity 
but upon a new statute enacted by California after the court’s dismissal 
of the Class B claims in Deirmenjian.127  The statute, California Code of 
Civil Procedure section 354.45 (akin to the previously-discussed section 
354.4 utilized by the plaintiffs in Movsesian128), was adopted by the 
California legislature specifically to help claimants overcome the 
 
union there is no limitation. 
 This section shall not apply to banks, bankers, trust companies, building and 
loan associations, industrial loan companies, credit unions, and savings and loan 
societies which have become insolvent and are in process of liquidation and in such 
cases the statute of limitations shall be deemed to have commenced to run from the 
beginning of the process of liquidation; provided, however, nothing herein 
contained shall be construed so as to relieve any stockholder of any banking 
corporation or trust company from stockholders’ liability as shall at any time, be 
provided by law. 
Id. 
124. Deirmenjian I, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96772, at *133 (“Defendants have failed to 
show that the Class A plaintiffs’ claims for recovery of bank deposits fall outside the scope of 
§ 348.  Therefore, the court denies their motions to dismiss the claims as untimely under 
California law.”). 
125. Id. at *149.  Under California law, the longest limitations period applicable to Class 
B plaintiffs’ claims would be four years, which had long ago expired.  Id. 
126. Id. at *149–51. 
127. Deirmenjian v. Deutsche Bank, A.G. (Deirmenjian II), 526 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1075 
(C.D. Cal. 2007). 
128. See discussion of the Movsesian litigation supra notes 47–82 and accompanying text. 
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prescription obstacle when filing suit in California courts for recovery of 
assets stolen during the Armenian Genocide.129  It provides as follows: 
 
Any action, including any pending action brought by an 
Armenian Genocide victim, or the heir or beneficiary of an 
Armenian Genocide victim, who resides in this state, seeking 
payment for, or the return of, deposited assets, or the return of 
looted assets, shall not be dismissed for failure to comply with 
the applicable statute of limitation, if the action is filed on or 
before December 31, 2016.130 
 
Plainly, under section 354.45, the Class B plaintiffs’ claims would now be 
timely. 
The court, however, held otherwise.  In another lengthy opinion, 
issued in December 2007, Judge Morrow found section 354.45 to be 
unconstitutional.131  According to Judge Morrow, the new California law 
impermissibly intruded on the foreign affairs power of the federal 
government to settle wartime claims of American citizens against 
Turkey and Germany arising out of World War I.132 
In reaching this result, Judge Morrow began her analysis with the 
post-World War I era, when the defeated Turkish and German empires 
and the victorious allies, including the United States, signed a series of 
treaties and executive agreements in the aftermath of the war.133  The 
most famous is the multilateral Treaty of Versailles of 1919, which 
ended hostilities between Germany and the Allied Powers.134  The 
United States never became a party to the Treaty of Versailles because 
the United States Senate failed to ratify the treaty signed by President 
Woodrow Wilson.135  In 1921, however, the United States and the new 
 
129. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 354.45 (West 2006); see also S. 1524, 2006 Leg. § 1 (Cal. 
2006) (explaining section 354.45’s connection with the Armenian Genocide). 
130. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 354.45(c). 
131. Deirmenjian II, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 1089. 
132. Id. at 1079. 
133. Id. at 1079–86 (explaining the history behind section 354.45 and the agreements 
during the post-World War I era that lead to its enactment). 
134. Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, June 28, 
1919, S. TREATY DOC. No. 348. 
135. Deirmenjian II, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 1084 & n.57.   
 
 [However,] [a]lthough the United States never ratified the Treaty of Versailles, 
select provisions of that treaty were incorporated, inter alia, into the executive 
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German Weimar Republic entered into a bilateral peace treaty, the 
Treaty of Berlin, which formally ended the hostilities between the two 
states.136  A year later, the two nations signed an executive agreement 
establishing a joint mixed commission to determine the amount of war 
reparations to be paid by Germany to the United States and its nationals 
pursuant to the Treaty of Berlin.137  In analyzing the two postwar pacts 
between the United States and Germany, Judge Morrow held that (1) 
they necessarily were meant to cover any claims of American nationals 
against Germany and its nationals or business entities arising out of 
World War I; and (2), as a consequence, barred the instant claims of 
Bakian and his fellow Class B plaintiffs against the two German banks 
that section 354.45 specifically resurrected.138 
The problem with the court’s reasoning was that it conflicted with 
the Movsesian decision issued five months earlier (the above-discussed 
lawsuit against German-based Victoria Insurance), which was decided 
by another Los Angeles-based federal judge, Judge Christina Snyder.  
Judge Snyder, in analyzing the same two pacts and their drafting history, 
found that that the Treaty of Berlin of 1921 and the Mixed Commission 
Agreement of 1922 did not preclude claims of American nationals 
against German-based companies like Victoria Insurance and Munich 
Re arising out of the World War I.139  The Deirmenjian court tried to 
distinguish the two decisions by noting that the plaintiffs in the 
Movsesian case were suing German insurance companies for purely 
private acts (failure to honor insurance contracts) while in the instant 
case, Bakian alleged in the complaint that the German banks “held th[e] 
looted assets as ‘agents’ of the regime during the Armenian 
 
agreement creating the mixed commission . . . .  [The Treaty of Berlin] secure[d] to 
the United States and its nationals rights specified under a resolution of the 
Congress of the United States of July 2, 1921, including rights under the Treaty of 
Versailles. 
Id. at 1084 n.57 (quoting Mixed Commission Agreement, U.S.-Ger., pmbl., Aug. 10, 1922, 42 
Stat. 2200). 
136. Treaty of Peace Between the United States and Germany, U.S.-Ger., Aug. 25, 1921, 
42 Stat. 1939. 
137. Mixed Commission Agreement, supra note 135, pmbl. 
138. Deirmenjian II, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 1081–85, 1089. 
139. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant Munich Re’s Motion to 
Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint at 29, Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, No. 
CV-03-09407 CAS (MCx) (C.D. Cal. June 7, 2007). 
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Genocide.”140  The distinction, however, is trifling, and hardly a solid 
basis upon which to hold a state statute unconstitutional.141 
Appearing to lack confidence in the correctness of this analysis, the 
court based its decision to annul section 354.45 upon another ground: 
the post-World War I agreements between Turkey and the Allied 
Powers, including the United States, which the court held also 
extinguished the claims allowed by section 354.45.142 
At the end of the World War I, the United States and the Republic 
of Turkey, the successor state to the Ottoman Turkish Empire (who was 
the losing co-belligerent, fighting on the side of Germany during the 
war), likewise entered into a bilateral agreement—called the Ankara 
Agreement of 1934.143  Under the agreement, which was entered into 
sixteen years after cessation of hostilities and the demise of the Ottoman 
Turkish Empire, the newly-formed Republic of Turkey agreed to pay 
the United States a “lump sum” of $1.3 million “in full settlement of 
claims of American citizens which are embraced by the Agreement of 
December 24, 1923.”144  “Following payment of the lump sum 
settlement, Fred K. Nielsen—who had been assigned to the Turkish–
American Claims Commission by the President in February 1933”—
released a report (the Nielsen Report) stating that the Ankara 
Agreement was to be the final settlement of all claims of Turkish 
liability.145  Judge Morrow relied on this statement in the Nielsen Report 
to come to the conclusion that the lump sum payment was intended by 
 
140. Deirmenjian II, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 1085 n.59. 
141. While not specifically so stating, Judge Morrow would most likely have made the 
same distinction with regard to the Class A plaintiffs in the Deirmenjian litigation.  Under 
Judge Morrow’s reasoning, because the same German banks were acting as agents of 
Ottoman Turkey when keeping the looted assets of the Armenians but purely as private 
actors when keeping the deposited assets of their Armenian customers, the U.S.–German 
Weimar Republic agreements extinguished the looted assets claims of Class B plaintiffs but 
not the deposited assets claims of Class A plaintiffs.  This difference in results between how 
the two classes of plaintiffs would fare in their claims against the German banks, based upon a 
legally insignificant designation of the German banks as “agents” in the portion of the 
Complaint setting out the looted assets claims, seems hardly a solid basis upon which to make 
a decision.  Moreover, since Judge Morrow gave Bakian another opportunity to amend the 
Complaint, the “agent” allegation could easily have been taken out from the next version of 
the Complaint. 
142. Deirmenjian II, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 1085. 
143. Agreement Between the United States and Turkey for the Settlement of Claims, 
U.S.-Turk., Oct. 25, 1934, E.A.S. No. 73 [hereinafter Ankara Agreement]. 
144. Id. art. 1. 
145. Deirmenjian II, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 1079–81. 
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the United States to settle all “wartime claims of American nationals of 
both Ottoman and non-Ottoman origin.”146 
In reaching the decision about how the Ankara Agreement should 
be interpreted, Judge Morrow did not rely on any expert testimony or 
hold additional hearings on the matter.  Rather, the court’s conclusion 
that the Ankara Agreement barred claims of naturalized American 
citizens who had earlier been subjects of the Ottoman Empire was based 
strictly on its reading of the Nielsen Report.147  A closer examination of 
the negotiating history of the Ankara Agreement demonstrates, 
however, that Judge Morrow’s conclusion that this postwar reparations 
settlement agreement between the United States and Turkey was meant 
to extinguish claims of former Ottoman subjects, including subjects who 
later became naturalized Armenian-Americans, was simply wrong. 
A correspondence of April 4, 1933, by the U.S. Secretary of State to 
the American Chargé d’Affaires in Turkey, noted that “[a] survey made 
several months ago of the claims then [being processed by the Turkish-
American Claims Commission] resulted in the rejection of a large group 
considered to be unsupportable.”148  Two months later, on June 27, 1933, 
the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrote to the U.S. Embassy in 
Turkey that the claims commission should only adjudicate 
 
claims . . . made by American citizens the American nationality 
of whom is not contested and who have suffered injury in 
Turkey. 
. . . . 
 In using the term “non-contested American nationality” this 
Ministry intends to exclude from the categories of American 
claimants individuals who at the time of the injury for which they 
claim reparation were, according to Turkish law, Ottoman 
subjects.149 
 
The newly-acquired American nationality of such individuals was to “be 
considered as null and void and he, himself, recognized as in the past a 
subject of the Ottoman Empire, shall under all circumstances be subject 
to the same treatment as is applied to subjects of the Ottoman 
 
146. Id. at 1081. 
147. See id. at 1079–85. 
148. Ankara Agreement, supra note 143, at 895. 
149. Id. at 901 (emphasis added). 
14 - BAZYLER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/2011  12:46 PM 
278 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [95:245 
Empire.”150  And as such, those claims could not be “invoked against 
Turkey . . . [or] be heard by the Mixed Commission as an American 
claim.”151 
These statements make clear that former Ottoman subjects who 
later became American nationals were not meant to be covered by the 
Ankara Agreement since they were treated, for the purposes of their 
claims, as Ottoman Turkish subjects. 
Subsequent travaux préparatoires confirm this understanding.  The 
original amount of total compensation estimated by the U.S. State 
Department to be obtained from Turkey was approximately $5 
million.152  In calculating that amount, the Americans had factored in the 
claims of “naturalized Americans.”153  Turkey responded with a counter-
proposal of $500,000—a reduction which represented, in part, its view 
that “the claims of naturalized citizens of Ottoman origin” were not to 
be considered.154  The United States had already anticipated this.155 
Settlement negotiations continued, and on March 11, 1934, the U.S. 
Ambassador received a note from the Turkish Foreign Ministry stating 
that “[m]y Government considers that in this second phase of the 
procedure the Commission would pronounce only upon claims of 
American citizens whose nationality is not contested and who have 
suffered loss in Turkey.”156  By August 14, 1934, 
 
[t]he Turkish Government ha[d] been notified that there [were] 
approximately 1900 claims of American citizens of Ottoman 
origin. The Turkish Foreign Office ha[d] through diplomatic 
channels informed the Government of the United States that the 
Turkish Government intended to exclude from the categories of 
American claimants persons who at the time of the injury for 
which they claim reparation were according to Turkish law 
Ottoman subjects.  It was agreed in the Committee that, in 
connection with the negotiations for a lump sum settlement, the 
 
150. Id. at 902. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. at 903. 
153. Id. at 904. 
154. Id. at 906. 
155. Id. at 905 (statement by U.S. Ambassador to Turkey) (“It seems evident that if a 
careful examination were made of the claims, keeping in mind the questions of principle for 
which reservation has been made, the total of the claims would unquestionably be reduced to 
a very low figure.”). 
156. Id. at 911–12. 
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legal issues involved in cases of this nature would not be 
discussed.157 
 
Thus, Turkey considered U.S. naturalized citizens to be citizens of 
Turkey, and did not agree to United States’ espousal of those claims.  
Judge Morrow’s conclusion, therefore, that Bakian’s claims were 
extinguished by the Ankara Agreement is simply not supported by the 
negotiating history of this bilateral treaty.  In fact, as the language of the 
negotiating history quoted above indicates, it appears that the claims of 
such claimants, either then or now, have never been extinguished.  Last, 
Judge Morrow’s reasoning in declaring California Civil Procedure Code 
section 354.45 unconstitutional, by interpreting the postwar agreements 
entered into by the United States with Germany and Turkey, is also 
circular.  On the one hand, Judge Morrow noted that if the Berlin 
Treaty did not extinguish claims that section 354.45 resurrected, then the 
Ankara Treaty surely did so158 (a point on which Judge Morrow and 
Judge Snyder appear to differ).  On the other hand, she just as 
emphatically concluded that if the Ankara Treaty did not extinguish the 
claims, then the Berlin Treaty did.159 
After this loss before Judge Morrow, the tide of litigation for both 
plaintiff classes turned against them.  From this point on, every one of 
Judge Morrow’s rulings in this case went in favor of the German banks. 
On March 23, 2008, plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification, 
which Judge Morrow denied on May 13, 2010.160  Judge Morrow stated 
that a class must be ascertainable in order to qualify for certification.161  
Further, she held that “a class is ascertainable if it is feasible for the 
court to determine whether a particular individual is a member.”162  The 
question, therefore, became whether it was feasible for this court to 
identify U.S. residents who are the successors in interest of Armenians 
who deposited assets at Deutsche and Dresdner bank offices in 
Ottoman Turkey during the class period.163 
 
157. Id. at 920 (emphasis added). 
158. Deirmenjian II, 526 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1085 (C.D. Cal. 2007). 
159. Id. at 1086–87. 
160. Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification and Motion for Leave to 
File a Third Amended Complaint at 3–4, Deirmenjian v. Deutsche Bank, A.G., No. CV 06-
00774 MMM (RCx) (C.D. Cal. May 13, 2006). 
161. Id. at 9. 
162. Id. at 10 (internal citation omitted). 
163. Id. at 17. 
14 - BAZYLER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/2011  12:46 PM 
280 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [95:245 
The plaintiffs contended that giving proper notice about the 
litigation would allow class members to find relevant information 
regarding their ancestors’ bank accounts.164  Under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(d), Judge Morrow did allow the plaintiffs to engage in pre-
certification communications with potential class members in order to 
find evidence of bank accounts.165  After doing so, she held, however, 
that the evidence that the plaintiffs discovered through the pre-
certification notices was insufficient to form an ascertainable class.166  
She explained that in making this determination, she took into account 
the fact that it was unlikely that the depositors and their heirs would 
have preserved any documentation of their accounts since most were 
killed or deported from Turkey and any record that the banks had were 
probably lost to history.167  In effect, Judge Morrow was denying class 
certification to the genocide victim group because the members of the 
victim group had been victims of a genocide. 
On June 21, 2010, the defendant German banks, on the heels of their 
class certification victory, filed a motion for summary judgment seeking 
to have Judge Morrow dismiss the entire case without a trial.  On July 
30, Judge Morrow granted that motion.168  Before doing so, and in 
response to the defendant banks’ motion, Judge Morrow held that in 
order to avoid the grant of summary judgment, the plaintiffs needed to 
file a statement setting forth the existence of a genuine issue necessary 
to be litigated.169  Further, Judge Morrow stated that the failure to offer 
such a statement constitutes a waiver of claims.170  Judge Morrow then 
held that Khachik Berian was the only plaintiff, out of the seven, to state 
a genuine issue of material fact.171  Accordingly, the court held that the 
failure of the other plaintiffs “to offer any argument or evidence in 
opposition to the defendants’ motion constitutes abandonment of their 
claims, and summary judgment is properly entered in [the defendants’] 
favor.”172  As to the only remaining plaintiff, Khachik Berian, his claim173 
 
164. Id. at 20.  
165. Id. at 21 (acknowledging that the court followed FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d)). 
166. Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, supra note 160, at 26–27. 
167. Id. at 28–29. 
168. Deirmenjian III, No. CV 06-00774 MMM (CWx), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86957, at 
*77 (C.D. Cal. July 30, 2010). 
169. Id. at *26–32. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. at *26. 
172. Id. at *26, *28. 
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was dismissed pursuant to Judge Morrow’s new holding that California’s 
statute of limitations did not apply in this matter.  As discussed above, 
Judge Morrow specifically held in 2006 that the deposited-assets claims 
of Class A plaintiffs like Berian were not time-barred because California 
Code of Civil Procedure section 348 states that there is no limitations 
period on any “actions brought to recover money or other property 
deposited with any bank.”174  In this case, Berian’s action sought to 
recover funds deposited by his Armenian ancestors with Deutsche 
Bank.175  In contrast to her earlier decision in 2006, Judge Morrow now 
held in 2010 that California Code of Civil Procedure section 348 was 
indeed not the correct statute to be used to determine the limitations 
 
173. Plaintiff Khachik Berian is the grandson and a surviving heir of Hatchik Berberian, 
“a well-to-do Armenian lawyer who lived in Ottoman Turkey.”  Opening Brief of Appellant 
Khachik Berian at 9, Deirmenjian v. Deutsche Bank, A.G., No. 10-56359 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 
2011).  Attorney Berberian allegedly maintained a bank account with the Constantinople 
branch of Deutsche Bank.  Id.  As a result of the genocide, Berberian fled to Greece with his 
wife and three children: two teenage sons, Levon and Aram, and a younger daughter, 
Zabelle.  Id. at 9–10.  Forty-eight other members of the Berberian family did not survive.  Id. 
at 10. 
 Fleeing Ottoman Turkey, Attorney Berberian was forced to leave his property behind 
but did take with him correspondence with the Constantinople branch of Deutsche Bank.  Id.  
These letters, dated from September 1914 through November 1915, confirm the existence in 
the name of Berberian of (1) an account with Deutsche Bank in Constantinople; (2) the 
amounts on deposit; and (3) the interest rate on the deposited funds.  Id.  Attorney Berberian 
died intestate in Greece some time before 1930, and his two sons, Levon and Aram, 
subsequently immigrated to Iran.  Id.  Khachik Berian, born in Iran and currently residing in 
California, is Aram’s son and along with his sister Magdalen are the only surviving heirs of 
Attorney Berberian.  Id. at 10–11.  They are in possession of the correspondence from 
Deutsche Bank, passed down from their grandfather to their uncle Levon.  Id. at 16–17.  
Berian and his sister discovered the bank documents in December 2008 after Levon’s wife, 
Allene, died.  Id. at 11 n.6, 17.  The Deutsche Bank documents were found in a drawer in 
their home in New Jersey.  Id.  Because Levon and Allene had no children, their nephew and 
niece, Berian and his sister Magdalen, remain the sole surviving heirs of this family.  Id. at 11.  
In February 2009, two months after discovery of the Deutsche Bank documents, Berian 
joined the Deirmenjian v. Deutsche Bank, AG lawsuit.  Id. at 6.  Deutsche Bank has no 
existing records of any deposits in its Constantinople branch, since those records were 
destroyed in the 1970s.  Id.  All of the above information is taken from the Excerpt of the 
Record filed by plaintiff/appellant Berian before the Ninth Circuit. 
174. Deirmenjian I, No. CV 06-00774 MMM (CWx), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96772, at 
*132–33 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2006) (citing and quoting CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 348 (West 
2006)). 
175. In the 2010 Order denying class action certification, Judge Morrow originally ruled 
that Berian lacked standing to bring a claim; thereafter, Berian produced additional evidence 
squarely addressing Judge Morrow’s concerns regarding standing, and the district court 
allowed his claim to proceed.  Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification and 
Motion for Leave to File a Third Amended Complaint at 3, Deirmenjian v. Deutsche Bank, 
A.G., No. 06-00774 MMM (RCx) (C.D. Cal. May 13, 2010). 
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period for Berian’s action.  Instead, she now held that under California’s 
choice-of-law analysis, the Turkish statute of limitations should be 
applied. 
Deirmenjian v. Deutsche Bank AG, which Berian later joined and 
currently remains the sole named class representative, was originally 
filed in California state court but then removed to federal court based 
on diversity jurisdiction.176  As a result, Judge Morrow reasoned that 
California choice-of-law rules necessarily applied.177  Judge Morrow then 
analyzed the choice-of-law issue by using the “governmental interest 
analysis” set forth by the California Supreme Court in a new decision 
issued in 2010: McCann v. Foster Wheeler LLC.178 
Applying the three-step governmental interest analysis of McCann, 
Judge Morrow found that: (1) there was a significant difference between 
California and either Turkish or German law because the “no 
limitations period for bank claims” and California’s delayed discovery 
rule (both of which may have saved the Deirmenjian and Berian claims) 
existed only under California law; (2) in analyzing each jurisdiction’s 
interest in the application of its own law, the judge held that California 
courts have consistently declined to recognize after-acquired residence 
as a source of governmental interest and that Turkey and Germany had 
significant interests in regulating banks headquartered in their borders; 
and, most critical, (3) California’s interest in the case was subordinate to 
Turkey’s interest in the acts giving rise to the Deirmenjian and Berian 
claims because the acts occurred in Turkish territory.179  Thus, Judge 
Morrow concluded that Turkey’s prescription statute of ten years for 
bank claims was indeed the statute to be applied in this suit, and, thus, 
barred the plaintiffs’ claims.180 
 
176. Deirmenjian III, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86957, at *3, *37. 
177. Id. at *37. 
178. Id. at *35–75 (analyzing McCann v. Foster Wheeler LLC, 225 P.3d 516 (Cal. 2010)).  
In McCann, the California Supreme Court had to decide whether, under a governmental 
interest analysis, the California statute of limitations or the Oklahoma statute of limitations 
should apply.  McCann, 225 P.3d at 519, 522.  Plaintiff, suffering from mesothelioma alleged 
to have come from exposure to asbestos from boilers manufactured by defendant, filed suit 
for personal injury.  Id. at 518.  The California Court of Appeal judgment finding that 
California law applied to the case was reversed by the California Supreme Court because, 
under the supreme court’s governmental interest analysis, Oklahoma’s interest would be 
more impaired than California’s interest if Oklahoma’s laws were not applied under the 
circumstances of the case.  Id. at 537. 
179. Deirmenjian III, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86957, at *51–55, *60–63. 
180. Id. at *60–61. 
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In reaching this conclusion, Judge Morrow, however, failed to take 
into account that there is a stark contrast between the facts that were 
before the court in Deirmenjian, involving losses from a mass atrocity, 
and the facts in McCann, involving a garden-variety personal injury 
case.  In the Armenian Genocide context there is abundant evidence of 
Turkey’s unwillingness, from the time of the Armenian Genocide until 
the present day, to address or even consider claims made by Armenians 
for material losses arising out of that genocide.  Turkish law makes it 
impossible for any Armenian Genocide heir to seek damages for losses 
under its domestic law, and no claimant has ever obtained compensation 
in Turkey for such losses.181  Finally, not only has Turkey long refused to 
acknowledge the Armenian Genocide, but the mere public mention of 
the genocide, or any reference to the fate of the Armenians in Turkey 
between 1915 and 1923 as constituting a genocide, can subject that 
speaker to criminal prosecution for the crime of insulting the Turkish 
nation.182 
In this context, therefore, Judge Morrow’s comparison of the choice-
of-law issue in the Armenian Genocide-era claims setting to the garden 
variety, sister-state choice-of-law issue in McCann simply makes no 
sense.  In fact, the California Supreme Court specifically held in 
McCann that the foreign jurisdiction’s interest (in that case, that of a 
sister-state, Oklahoma) must be considered in light of the application of 
its “own law to the case at hand.”183  But Judge Morrow failed to consider 
this.  Judge Morrow’s holding, if allowed to stand, has far-reaching 
implications because the application of a Turkish statute of limitations 
 
181. See id. 
182. Turkish Penal Code Section 301, in effect since 2005 and amended in 2008, states 
the following: 
 
 1. Public denigration of Turkishness, the Republic or the Grand National 
Assembly of Turkey, shall be punishable by imprisonment of between six months 
and three years. 
 2. Public denigration of the Government of the Republic of Turkey, the judicial 
institutions of the State, the military or security organizations shall be punishable by 
imprisonment of between six months and two years. 
 3. In cases where denigration of Turkishness is committed by a Turkish citizen 
in another country the punishment shall be increased by one third. 
 4. Expressions of thought intended to criticize shall not constitute crime. 
Id.  For a general discussion of Section 301, see Jahnisa Tate, Note, Turkey’s Article 301: A 
Legitimate Tool For Maintaining Order or a Threat to Freedom of Expression?, 37 GA. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 181 (2008). 
183. McCann, 225 P.3d at 523 (emphasis added). 
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period for any Armenian Genocide-era restitution claim will necessarily 
act as a bar to that claim.  The 2010 Deirmenjian holding stands for the 
proposition that even if Armenian Genocide claims are not time-barred 
under California’s statute of limitations, such claims would nonetheless 
be barred by the courts’ application of Turkey’s statute of limitations.  
Given that defendants often raise a statute of limitations defense on a 
motion to dismiss or demurrer, defendants in any future action in the 
United States arising out of material losses from the Armenian 
Genocide are likely to raise these arguments at the pleading stage and 
stand a good chance to have the case dismissed if Judge Morrow’s 
conclusion that the Turkish prescription period applied. 
On August 27, 2010, Berian (both on his own behalf and on behalf of 
the Class A plaintiffs similarly situated) filed an appeal before the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals seeking to have Judge Morrow’s ruling that 
the Turkish limitations period applies to Armenian Genocide-era claims 
overturned.184  As of this writing, the appeal has yet to be considered. 
IV.  TURKISH FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FROM CLAIMS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
As the previous discussion demonstrates, filing Armenian Genocide-
era suits in American courts presents a number of significant legal 
obstacles.  Nevertheless, such suits will not necessarily end in failure.  
The successful settlements in the Armenian insurance litigation provide 
both important inspiration and significant legal precedent for suits 
against other insurers that might have sold policies to Armenians in 
Ottoman Turkey and that did not fully pay out these policies.  The 2010 
decision of the Ninth Circuit in Movsesian II upholding a California 
state statute recognizing Armenian Genocide-era restitution claims goes 
beyond just recognizing such claims for insurance.  Invariably, other 
Armenian Genocide-era losses, including claims for theft of cultural 
property, can be given momentum through similar state laws 
recognizing such claims. 
 
184. See Opening Brief of Appellant Khachik Berian, supra note 173, at 1–2 (explaining 
that Berian only appealed the judgment against Deutsche Bank because this is the bank 
where his ancestors allegedly deposited funds in Ottoman Turkey).  Defendant Dresdner 
Bank, therefore, is no longer a party on the appeal.  Id.  Additionally, since no Class B 
plaintiff (representing the looted assets claims) filed an appeal, those claims also are not 
before the Ninth Circuit.  See id. 
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While for now the German banks litigation has been dismissed, the 
ruling in Movsesian II, which recognized the constitutionality of 
California Code of Civil Procedure section 354.4, portends that Judge 
Morrow’s decision will be reversed on appeal by the Ninth Circuit.  
California Code of Civil Procedure section 354.4 allows for the 
extension of the statute of limitations for insurance claims resulting from 
the Armenian Genocide.185  Section 354.45, which Judge Morrow ruled 
unconstitutional, contains the exact same statutory language as section 
354.4.186  The only difference in the statutory language is that section 
354.4 allows claims against insurance companies, while section 354.45 
allows claims against banks.187  This subtle difference is inconsequential, 
and, accordingly, the ruling of constitutionality of section 354.4 by the 
Ninth Circuit in Movsesian II appears to trump the ruling of the district 
court on the constitutionality of section 354.45 by Judge Morrow. 
The next step in the Armenian Genocide litigation would be the 
filing of a suit against the Republic of Turkey and its state-owned 
businesses for profiting from the Armenian Genocide.  In any such suit, 
Turkey and its state-owned entities are bound to raise the same defenses 
already raised by the insurance companies and the German banks.  
These include (1) forum non conveniens; (2) act of state and political 
question doctrines; and (3) statute of limitations.  The partly successful 
parrying of these defenses by the Armenian plaintiffs in the litigation to 
date demonstrates that Turkey and its state-owned entities, when sued 
for acts arising out of the Armenian Genocide, will not necessarily 
prevail upon assertion of these defenses. 
Turkey and its political subdivisions, and agencies and 
instrumentalities, however, possess one additional defense not available 
to the private defendants already sued: foreign sovereign immunity.  
The remaining sections will discuss this defense and how to confront it. 
A.  Foreign Sovereign Immunity as a Bar to a Suit Against Turkey 
Whenever foreign states are sued in the United States they 
inevitably assert that the doctrine of sovereign immunity protects them 
 
185. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
186. Compare CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.4 (West 2006), with CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 
§ 354.45 (West 2006) (showing that these statutes contain the same language, differing only in 
regard to allowing litigation against banks versus insurance companies). 
187. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 354.4(b), 354.45(b). 
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from such litigation.188  Up until 1952, courts in the United States 
adhered to an absolute view of sovereign immunity under which a 
foreign state enjoyed immunity from all suits in United States federal 
courts.189  In 1952, however, the acting Legal Adviser of the State 
Department, Jack Tate, sent a letter to the acting Attorney General 
announcing that the State Department was adopting a more restrictive 
principle of foreign sovereign immunity.190  Under the restrictive 
principle, the immunity of a foreign sovereign would be recognized with 
regard to a sovereign’s “public” acts, but would not be recognized with 
respect to a sovereign’s “private” acts.191  Restrictive sovereign immunity 
acknowledges that not all acts of a state are sovereign in nature: the 
state may be acting akin to that of a commercial enterprise, and in such 
instances, immunity to suits based on such private acts should not be 
recognized.192 
 
188. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 14, at 219 (explaining that the United States 
recognizes that “foreign states and state-related entities enjoy important immunities from the 
judicial jurisdiction of national courts”).  “Issues of foreign sovereign immunity arise with 
considerable frequency in contemporary international litigation.  This is because of the 
extensive involvement of foreign governments and their agencies—including airlines, banks, 
shipping lines, and other ‘commercial’ entities—in international trade and finance.”  Id. 
189. See, e.g., Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486–87 (1983) 
(providing a brief history of foreign sovereign immunity claims in the United States); 
Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812) (finding a French vessel 
immune from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts). 
190. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State, to Phillip B. 
Perlman, Acting Att’y Gen. (May 19, 1952), reprinted in Change of Policy on Sovereign 
Immunity of Foreign Governments, 26 DEP’T ST. BULL. 984, 984–85 (1952); see also 
Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487 & n.9 (highlighting the letter). 
191. Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 705 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(referring to sovereign public acts as jure imperii of a state, and sovereign private acts as jure 
gestionis). 
192. BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 14, at 259.  Born and Rutledge explain as follows: 
 
As recounted in the Tate Letter, the increase in the trading activities of foreign 
governmental entities was central to the development of the restrictive theory of 
sovereign immunity.  Consistent with these developments, § 1605(a)(2) of the FSIA 
denies immunity to certain commercial activities of foreign states.  This is the single 
most important exception to foreign sovereign immunity in the United States. 
Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2006).  Section 1605(a) reads, in part, as follows: 
 
 (a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the 
United States or of the States in any case— 
 (1) in which the foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly 
or by implication, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver which the 
foreign state may purport to effect except in accordance with the terms of 
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Though the Tate Letter provided a new perspective by which to 
utilize the concept of foreign sovereign immunity, “it did not provide 
courts with concrete legislative standards for determining” when the 
restrictive view of sovereign immunity should be adopted.193  This lack of 
a clear judicial standard led Congress in 1976 to adopt the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). 
B.  The Applicability of FSIA and Its Exceptions to Events Arising out of 
the Armenian Genocide 
Any discussion of the utilization of foreign sovereign immunity by a 
foreign defendant being sued in American courts must begin with the 
language of FSIA.  After years of finding foreign sovereigns absolutely 
immune from suit in the United States and giving the Executive Branch, 
through the State Department, the ability to carve out case-by-case 
exceptions to such immunity, Congress decided in 1976 that “the 
determination by United States courts of the claims of foreign states to 
immunity from the jurisdiction of such courts would serve the interests 
of justice and would protect the rights of both foreign states and litigants 
in United States courts.”194  As a result, Congress enacted FSIA to 
provide judicial standards needed to litigate a foreign sovereign’s claim 
to immunity from possible lawsuits in the United States.195  Entities 
entitled to immunity from suits—and subject to FSIA’s enumerated 
 
the waiver; 
 (2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on 
in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the 
United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state 
elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in 
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and 
that act causes a direct effect in the United States; 
 (3) in which rights in property taken in violation of international law 
are in issue and that property or any property exchanged for such 
property is present in the United States in connection with a commercial 
activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or that 
property or any property exchanged for such property is owned or 
operated by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and that 
agency or instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the 
United States. 
§ 1605(a)(1)–(3). 
193. Siderman, 965 F.2d at 705. 
194. 28 U.S.C. § 1602. 
195. Id. 
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exceptions—are (1) the foreign state itself; (2) its political subdivisions; 
and (3) its agencies or instrumentalities.196 
The statute begins by making foreign sovereign immunity the 
presumptive standard, and then provides that such immunity will be 
subject to a list of exceptions laid out in subsequent code sections.197  For 
purposes of litigation against Turkey, the only relevant exceptions are 
(1) the “commercial activity” exception, and (2) the “takings” 
exception.198 
One may rightly first ask, however, why FSIA and its exceptions 
should be applied to acts that took place before the Act’s enactment in 
1976.  Turkey’s initial immunity argument, therefore, will be that FSIA 
is not even applicable to a suit based upon acts taking place during the 
Armenian Genocide, years before FSIA and its restrictive theory 
became federal law.  Here, however, the Holocaust restitution litigation 
provides an important precedent to successfully defeat this argument. 
In 2004, the United States Supreme Court accepted an appeal of a 
Nazi looted-art case, Republic of Austria v. Altmann,199 specifically to 
address the issue of the retroactivity of FSIA.  In Altmann, the 
defendant, the Republic of Austria, argued that it was entitled to 
absolute sovereign immunity under pre-1976 law because the artworks 
sought by Holocaust survivor and Los Angeles resident Maria Altmann 
from Austria had all been allegedly taken during the Nazi era.200  The 
 
196. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603.  The three classes of foreign sovereign defendants are set out 
as follows: 
 
For purposes of [FSIA]— 
 (a) A “foreign state” . . . includes a political subdivision of a foreign state or an 
agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in subsection (b). 
 (b) An “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state” means any entity— 
 (1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and 
 (2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, 
or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a 
foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and 
 (3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as defined 
in section 1332 (c) and (e) of this title, nor created under the laws of any 
third country. 
Id. § 1603(a)–(b). 
197. 28 U.S.C. § 1604. 
198. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1)–(3).  
199. (Altmann III), 541 U.S. 677, 700 (2004). 
200. Id. at 686.  “[T]hey claimed that as of 1948, when much of their alleged wrongdoing 
took place, they would have enjoyed absolute immunity from suit in United States courts.  
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Supreme Court held otherwise, finding that when Congress enacted 
FSIA it envisioned its application to all suits filed after the passage of 
the law, even if the suit against the foreign state was based on wrongful 
conduct that took place before 1976.201  The Altmann decision, therefore, 
opened up an entire category of suits against foreign sovereigns for acts 
that took place years ago, even those going back to the beginning of the 
twentieth century. 
The applicability of FSIA and its exceptions to pre-enactment 
conduct means that Turkey will not succeed in arguing that it possesses 
absolute sovereign immunity to acts arising out of the Armenian 
Genocide.  Any Armenian plaintiff who wishes to defeat an assertion of 
sovereign immunity by Turkey need fit his or her particular factual 
situation into only one or more of the enumerated exceptions to FSIA 
in order to establish the jurisdiction of a U.S. court over the claim. 
1. The “Commercial Activities” Exception 
FSIA states that a foreign state will not be able to claim sovereign 
immunity in any case where 
 
the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the 
United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in 
the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the 
foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of 
the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the 
foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the 
United States.202 
 
This exception would match up with a Turkish-owned commercial 
enterprise currently doing business in the United States and that was in 
existence during the time of the Armenian Genocide and actively 
participated in profiting from assets stolen from Armenian citizens 
during that time. 
Case law further explains that, regardless of the motive behind a 
particular activity, that activity will be deemed “commercial” if it is the 
 
Proceeding from this premise, petitioners next contended that nothing in the FSIA should be 
understood to divest them of that immunity retroactively.”  Id. 
201. Id. at 686–87. 
202. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). 
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type through which a private party engages in trade or commerce.203  An 
Armenian plaintiff must distinguish governmental, public, or sovereign 
enterprises (e.g., providing national defense, or running police 
departments or parks) from the disputed Turkish acts or acts of agencies 
or instrumentalities in what would be deemed commercial capacity (e.g., 
operating banks,  hotels, or cruise ships). 
Once an Armenian plaintiff is able to establish that the Turkish 
government, or its agency or instrumentality, has engaged in commercial 
activity, that plaintiff will then be required to establish a nexus between 
the disputed commercial activity and the plaintiff’s grievance.204  This is 
needed as the language of the statute requires a causal showing that the 
claim is “based upon” commercial activity by a foreign sovereign.205  As 
such, the plaintiff would have to show that, but for the commercial 
actions of Turkey, or its agency or instrumentality, the plaintiff’s claim 
would not have arisen. 
This is usually the most difficult step for plaintiffs suing a foreign 
state for human rights abuses and seeking to use the commercial activity 
exception as the basis of jurisdiction because the human rights victim is 
required to show that his or her suit is, in fact, based upon the 
commercial activity of the foreign state.  In Saudi Arabia v. Nelson,206 
Scott Nelson, an American citizen, was hired to work in Saudi Arabia as 
an engineer at a state-owned hospital.207  While there, he was arrested, 
and before being released and allowed to return to the United States, he 
was allegedly tortured and he suffered other brutal mistreatment at the 
hands of Saudi prison officials.208  In his personal injury lawsuit, the 
Supreme Court ultimately held that the suit was barred under FSIA.209  
Nelson’s reliance on the commercial activity exception was misplaced, 
said the Court, reasoning that his suit was based upon the injuries 
inflicted upon him by the Saudi prison authorities—an essentially 
sovereign activity—and not upon the commercial activity of being hired 
 
203. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992); Sun v. Taiwan, 
201 F.3d 1105, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000); Malewicz v. City of Amsterdam, 362 F. Supp. 2d 298, 313 
(D.D.C. 2005). 
204. See Santos v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 934 F.2d 890, 892 (7th Cir. 1991) 
(highlighting the nexus requirement). 
205. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). 
206. 507 U.S. 349 (1993). 
207. Id. at 351–52. 
208. Id. at 353. 
209. Id. at 351. 
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in the United States to work in Saudi Arabia.210  The commercial 
activity, while present in the case, was only tangential to the actual basis 
of the lawsuit: abuse inflicted by Saudi government officials.211  The 
Nelson case, therefore, presents a severe restriction upon the use of the 
commercial activity exception in suits against foreign states for human-
rights wrongs. 
However, since the contemplated suits against Turkey and its state-
owned commercial enterprises focus on property losses arising out of 
the Armenian Genocide and the subsequent use of such property by 
defendants to generate profits in the United States, the based-upon 
requirement of the commercial activity exception may be met in such 
suits.  An Armenian plaintiff would have to show that Turkey’s current 
commercial activities in the United States are somehow materially 
related to the activities that form the basis of the plaintiff’s claim arising 
out of the Armenian Genocide.  For example, if an Armenian plaintiff 
were to bring a claim against a Turkish-owned bank that operated in 
Turkey during the Armenian Genocide and had acquired the plaintiff’s 
ancestor’s stolen assets, and that bank currently does business in the 
United States with some of those assets, this may satisfy the commercial 
activity exception’s nexus requirement stipulated in section 1605(a)(2). 
2. The “Takings” Exception 
FSIA further states that a foreign state will not be able to claim 
sovereign immunity in any case where 
 
rights in property taken in violation of international law are in 
issue and that property or any property exchanged for such 
property is present in the United States in connection with a 
commercial activity carried on in the United States by the 
foreign state; or that property or any property exchanged for 
such property is owned or operated by an agency or 
instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or 




210. Id. at 361–63. 
211. See id. at 362–63. 
212. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3). 
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FSIA divides this exception into several parts, making several 
requirements necessary to successfully implement it against the 
assertion of foreign sovereign immunity.  If the lawsuit is against the 
foreign state, the requirements are (1) property, or rights in property, 
must have been taken in violation of international law; and (2) that 
property, or any property exchanged for such property, is in the United 
States in connection with commercial activity carried on by a foreign 
state in the United States.213  If the lawsuit is against an agency or 
instrumentality of the foreign state—in essence, a state-owned 
enterprise—then the illegally-taken property (1) must be shown to be 
currently owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of a 
foreign state; and (2) that agency or instrumentality is engaged in 
commercial activity in the United States.214 
Again, Holocaust restitution suits provide helpful precedent to the 
Armenian plaintiff seeking to rely on the takings exception.  In Altmann 
v. Republic of Austria, the plaintiff instituted a claim for six paintings 
that were the property of her uncle before the Nazis took the paintings 
 
213. Id. 
214. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a)–(e) (2006).  Definitions of the terms “agency or 
instrumentality of a foreign state” and “commercial activity” are found in section 1603: 
 
 (a) A “foreign state”, except as used in section 1608 of this title, includes a 
political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign 
state as defined in subsection (b). 
 (b) An “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state” means any entity— 
 (1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and 
 (2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, 
or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a 
foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and 
 (3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as defined 
in section 1332(c) and (e) of this title, nor created under the laws of any 
third country. 
 (c) The “United States” includes all territory and waters, continental or insular, 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. 
 (d) A “commercial activity” means either a regular course of commercial 
conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act.  The commercial character of 
an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct 
or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose. 
 (e) A “commercial activity carried on in the United States by a foreign state” 
means commercial activity carried on by such state and having substantial contact 
with the United States. 
Id. § 1603(a)–(e). 
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in Austria in 1938.215  Though the paintings all went through various 
channels, they all eventually ended up in the possession of the Austrian 
National Art Gallery (Gallery), an agency or instrumentality of Austria, 
which refused to return the paintings to the plaintiff.216  The plaintiff 
then sought to recover the paintings under the takings exception to 
FSIA.217 
The Central District of California enumerated three distinct 
requirements in order to substantiate a valid taking under international 
law: “First, the taking must serve a public purpose; second, aliens 
[whose property is taken] must not be discriminated against or singled 
out for regulation by the state; and third, payment of just compensation 
must be made.”218  In Altmann, the plaintiff illustrated that the taking of 
the art by the Nazis discriminated against Jews and that the art was 
taken without just compensation.219 
The Gallery attempted to combat this assertion by stating that “[a] 
plaintiff cannot complain that a taking has not been fairly compensated 
unless the plaintiff has first pursued and exhausted the domestic 
remedies in the foreign state that is alleged to have caused the injury.”220  
However, as the court pointed out, if the “domestic remedies are a 
sham, are inadequate, or would be unreasonably prolonged,” the 
exhaustion requirement is excused.221  In the Altmann litigation, the 
 
215. Altmann v. Republic of Austria (Altmann I), 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1192–93 (C.D. 
Cal. 2001). 
216. Id. at 1194–96. 
217. Id. at 1202–03. 
218. Id. at 1202 (citing Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 711–
12 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
219. Id. at 1203. 
220. Id. (citing Greenpeace, Inc. v. France, 946 F. Supp. 773, 783 (C.D. Cal. 1996)). 
221. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 713 (1986)).  
The Restatement provides the following: 
 
 (1) A state whose national has suffered injury under § 711 or § 712 has, as 
against the state responsible for the injury, the remedies generally available 
between states for violation of customary law, § 902, as well as any special remedies 
provided by any international agreement applicable between the two states. 
 (2) A person of foreign nationality injured by a violation of § 711 or § 712 may 
pursue any remedy provided by 
 (a) international agreement between the person’s state of nationality 
and the state responsible for the injury; 
 (b) the law of the state responsible for the injury, 
 (c) the law of another state, or 
 
14 - BAZYLER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/2011  12:46 PM 
294 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [95:245 
remedies available in Austria for the plaintiff were deemed inadequate 
due to the fact her claim would be barred by the statute of limitations, as 
well as the fact that her filing fees would be between $130,000 and 
$200,000, which were egregious and unreasonable fees by the court’s 
estimation.222 
Altmann makes clear the course, under the first prong, for a 
potential Armenian plaintiff against Turkey, or its agency or 
instrumentality.  Initially, a plaintiff must establish a non-frivolous claim 
of a taking through the elements enumerated.  For example, if real or 
personal property was taken from an Armenian plaintiff’s ancestors 
during the time of the Armenian Genocide and just compensation was 
not paid for such property, the jurisdictional requirements laid out by 
the U.S. court under Altmann would be satisfied.  Next, the plaintiff 
must establish that the remedies available for the claim in Turkey are 
non-existent.223  Since Turkey does not even recognize the Armenian 
Genocide as having happened, and will therefore not likely recognize 
any claims arising from the genocide, no remedy exists for the plaintiff 
by filing suit in Turkey. 
Finally, the plaintiff must show that the Turkish, state-owned 
institution or enterprise engages in commercial activity in the United 
States.  “Commercial activity” is defined by FSIA as “either a regular 
course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or 
act.”224  Noteworthy in the second clause of the exception, is that the 
defendant Turkish institution or enterprise need not engage in United 
 
 (d) agreement between the person injured and the state responsible 
for the injury. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 713. 
222. Altmann I, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1209–10. 
223. See id. at 1203.  See also Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, where the Court provided as 
follows: 
 
At the outset of any forum non conveniens inquiry, the court must determine 
whether there exists an alternative forum.  Ordinarily, this requirement will be 
satisfied when the defendant is “amenable to process” in the other jurisdiction. . . .  
[H]owever, where the remedy offered by the other forum is clearly unsatisfactory, 
the other forum may not be an adequate alternative . . . .  Thus, for example, 
dismissal would not be appropriate where the alternative forum does not permit 
litigation of the subject matter of the dispute. 
454 U.S. 235, 254 n.22 (1981) (internal citations omitted). 
224. See supra note 214 (showing, inter alia, the elements and definitions of “commercial 
activity” by a “foreign state”). 
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States-based commercial activities with the looted property.225  Unlike a 
suit undertaken against a foreign state pursuant to the first clause of the 
taking exception or the commercial activity exception with its based-
upon requirement, no nexus is required in suits asserting loss of 
property claims against state-owned defendants and their commercial 
activities in the United States.  As long as that entity (1) owns or 
operates the looted property and (2) does business in the United States, 
with the looted property or otherwise, it is subject to suit in American 
courts.226  In Altmann, for instance, the Austrian Gallery that displayed 
the looted Klimt artworks in its museum published a book, Klimt’s 
Women, with Yale University Press in the United States, and this book 
was viewed as further promoting within the United States the Gallery’s 
collection in Austria, including the looted paintings.227  As explained by 
the federal judge hearing the case, the plaintiff’s allegations establishing 
commercial activities in the United States included that  
 
the Gallery publishes a museum guidebook in English available 
for purchase by United States citizens, including those in the 
Central District [of California, the site of the lawsuit], and the 
Gallery’s collection, including the paintings at issue in this 
action, is advertised in the United States, including in the Central 
District.  Moreover, the Gallery is visited by thousands of United 
States citizens each year, including United States citizens that 
reside in the Central District.  Additionally, the Gallery has lent 
Adele Bloch–Bauer I to the United States in the past.228 
 
The court found sufficient commercial activities by the Gallery in the 
United States and thus applied the takings exception to combat the 
claim of sovereign immunity.229  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit agreed: 
“Because Appellants profit from the Klimt paintings in the United 
 
225. See supra note 214.  28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2006) allows an exception to foreign 
sovereign immunity for “any property exchanged for such property [that] is owned or 
operated by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and [when] that agency or 
instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the United States.”  This section 
eliminates the need for the agency or instrumentality to be engaged in commercial activity 
with the property that was taken. 
226. See supra note 192 accompanying text (explaining this requirement under 28 U.S.C 
§ 1605(a)(3) (2006)). 
227. Altmann v. Republic of Austria (Altmann II), 317 F.3d 954, 969 (9th Cir. 2002). 
228. Altmann I, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1204–05. 
229. Id. at 1205–06. 
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States, by authoring, promoting, and distributing books and other 
publications exploiting these very paintings, these actions are sufficient 
to constitute ‘commercial activity’ for the purpose of satisfying FSIA, as 
well as the predicates for personal jurisdiction.”230 
The above statements, tying the looted property to the Austrian 
museum’s United States-based commercial activities, can be misleading.  
As noted above, under the second clause of section 1605(a)(3) dealing 
with sovereign agencies and instrumentalities—as opposed to the first 
clause dealing with the immunity of the foreign state itself—any 
commercial activity of the Gallery in the United States would have been 
sufficient to deny it sovereign immunity.  Though both the district court 
and the Ninth Circuit in Altmann found that the Austrian state-owned 
museum did use the looted Klimt paintings in their United States-based 
commercial activities, the plain language of the second clause does not 
make this a requirement to deny foreign sovereign immunity.231 
In Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, a federal trial judge in Los Angeles, 
deciding whether the court had jurisdiction over Spain in a suit seeking 
the return of a Nazi-looted artwork, followed the reasoning in 
Altmann.232  The plaintiff sought “to recover from the Kingdom of Spain 
. . . and the state-owned Thyssen–Bornemisza Collection Foundation 
(the “Foundation”) a painting by Camille Pissaro that the Nazis 
extorted from his grandmother in 1939 as a condition to issuing her an 
exit visa.”233  After changing hands numerous times, the painting ended 
up being purchased by the Foundation from Baron Thyssen–
Bornemisza, along with the rest of the Baron’s art collection, for $327 
million.234  In the Cassirer suit, the federal trial judge found that the 
defendant, a Spanish art foundation, like the Austrian Gallery in 
Altmann, had engaged in commercial activity in the United States.235 
The case was appealed and four years later the Ninth Circuit, sitting 
en banc, agreed, stating, “The Foundation, which claims to own the 
Pissarro that was taken from Cassirer’s grandmother, has engaged in 
various activities in the United States—some of which relate to the 
painting and encourage Americans to visit the museum—that show a 
 
230. Altmann II, 317 F.3d at 959. 
231. See supra notes 227–28 and accompanying text. 
232. 461 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1161, 1165, 1172 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
233. Id. at 1161. 
234. Id.  
235. Id. at 1170–72. 
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commercial activity for purposes of section 1605(a)(3).”236  The Cassirer 
appellate court explicitly stated that, as § 1603(d) provides, “The 
commercial character of an activity shall be determined by reference to 
the nature of the conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by 
reference to its purpose.”237  Thus, it does not matter that the 
Foundation’s activities are undertaken on behalf of a non-profit 
museum to further its cultural mission.  “The important thing is that the 
actions are ‘the type of actions by which a private party engages in trade 
and traffic or commerce.’”238  Thus, the primary inquiry is whether a 
private party may engage in the type of activity at issue.239  The appellate 
court then turned to the Siderman and Altmann cases as examples, 
showing that “commercial activity” is merely a jurisdictional issue: 
 
 We have considered the question before.  In Siderman, we 
concluded that the Sidermans’ allegations concerning 
Argentina’s solicitation and entertainment of American guests at 
an expropriated hotel and the hotel’s acceptance of American 
credit cards and traveler’s checks were sufficient at the 
jurisdictional stage to show that Argentina was engaged in a 
commercial activity in the United States.  In Altmann, we 
likewise held that the Gallery, which was an instrumentality of 
the Austrian government and owned the Klimt paintings 
allegedly confiscated from the plaintiff’s family, engaged in a 
commercial activity in the United States.  This was based on 
allegations (assumed to be true) that the Gallery authored, 
edited and published in the United States a book about the 
women in Klimt paintings and a guidebook with photographs of 
the stolen paintings; and it advertised Gallery exhibitions in this 
country.  The publication and sale of these materials, and 
marketing of a Klimt exhibition in the United States, were 
commercial activities in themselves, and also were a means of 
attracting Americans to the Gallery. 
 Here, the Foundation has had many contacts with the United 
States, including some that encourage Americans to visit the 
 
236. Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 616 F.3d 1019, 1037 (9th Cir. 2010). 
237. Id. at 1027. 
238. Id. at 1032 (citing and quoting Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 
607, 614 (1992)). 
239. Id. (citing Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 708 (9th Cir. 
1992) (quoting Joseph v. Office of the Consulate Gen. of Nigeria, 830 F.2d 1018, 1024 (9th 
Cir. 1987))). 
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museum where the Pissarro is featured, and some that relate to 
the painting itself. . . .  [W]e cannot say its endeavors fall short of 
being a commercial activity for jurisdictional purposes under the 
second prong of § 1605(a)(3).240 
 
It bears repeating here also, that while the Ninth Circuit found in 
Cassirer that some of the United States-based commercial activities of 
the Foundation “relate to the painting itself,” this fact is superfluous.  
The mere fact that the Foundation holds the painting taken in violation 
of international law (even if in Spain) and at the same time conducts 
commercial activities in the United States was enough to deny the 
Foundation sovereign immunity to the suit. 
For purposes of an Armenian suit against an agency or 
instrumentality of Turkey, a plaintiff would merely have to show the 
existence of some sort of commercial activity by that Turkish agency or 
instrumentality in the United States of the kind shown by the plaintiffs 
in Altmann and Cassirer.  To emphasize, the commercial activity in the 
United States of the Turkish-owned entity need not be extensive and 
can be wholly unconnected with the actual theft taken against that 
Armenian plaintiff’s ancestor during the Armenian Genocide.  For 
example, if a plaintiff could show that a Turkish-owned bank had, 
during the Genocide, seized or participated in the seizure of, moneys 
deposited by an Armenian ancestor of the plaintiff, or had profited from 
looted assets stolen from the Armenian victims, and if the plaintiff could 
further show that the bank does business in the United States by such 
acts as U.S.-based currency exchanges or advertising, then that Turkish 
agency or instrumentality would be subject to the jurisdiction of an 
American court.  This is wholly different from the more rigid 
requirement of the commercial activities exception where the actual 
commercial activity of the defendant must be the basis of the lawsuit.241 
In Cassirer, Spain and its Foundation raised a number of rebuttal 
arguments that further elucidate the potential issues in an Armenian 
Genocide-based lawsuit against a Turkish entity.  One such relevant 
argument was Spain’s assertion that the taking was not “in violation of 
 
240. Id. at 1033–34 (internal citations omitted). 
241. Id. at 1033.  “The Foundation faults the district court for having failed to require a 
nexus between the activity and the lawsuit, as well as a quantum of activity that has a 
substantial connection with the United States.”  Id.  The court clearly states, however, that 
the nexus requirement is not required within the meaning of the “takings exception.”  Id. 
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international law” since Cassirer’s grandmother from whom the painting 
was looted was a German national and, as such, a taking by the Nazi 
German state from its own national did not implicate violations of 
international law.242  However, the court accepted plaintiff’s compelling 
evidence that Jews in Nazi Germany were not viewed as citizens at that 
time.243  As such, the court concluded that the plaintiff’s grandmother’s 
citizenship did not preclude the plaintiff from utilizing the exception: 
 
The issue regarding the applicability of this exception arises 
because the statute uses the passive voice and does not expressly 
require that the foreign state (against whom the claim is made) 
be the entity that took the property in violation of international 
law.  Appellants invite us to read such a requirement into the 
statute.  The parties agree that Germany, and not Spain, 
allegedly took the Painting in violation of international law. 
Therefore, under the construction urged by Appellants, the 
expropriation exception could not apply.  We disagree.244 
 
In the case of a plaintiff bringing a claim against Turkey for taking of 
property of his or her Armenian ancestor arising out of the Armenian 
Genocide, this particular element in Cassirer and Altmann may prove to 
be a bit more difficult.  In Altmann, the court specifically enumerated 
that “in order to fall into this exception, the plaintiff cannot be a citizen 
of the defendant country at the time of the expropriation, because 
expropriation by a sovereign state of the property of its own nationals 
does not implicate settled principles of international law.”245  In these 
cases, citizenship was a non-issue since the immediate victim of the 
looting in Altmann was a Czech citizen,246 and Cassirer provided 
evidence that Jewish people were not considered citizens in Nazi 
Germany.247 
 
242. Id. at 1024 (explaining this argument from previous rulings and dismissing it on the 
grounds that Spain need not be the entity who took the property). 
243. Id. at 1023. 
244. Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 580 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d on 
rehearing en banc, 616 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2010). 
245. Altmann II, 317 F.3d 954, 968 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotations omitted). 
246. Id. 
247. Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 1157, 1165 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
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At first glance, Armenian citizens of Ottoman Turkey have no 
recourse against this citizenship requirement as they were, at least 
technically, citizens of Turkey at the time of the genocide. 
Nevertheless, a credible argument can be made that Armenians 
living in Ottoman Turkey during the time of the Armenian Genocide 
were in a situation comparable to that of Jews living in Nazi Germany: 
they were subjects of that state but not its citizens.  In Ottoman Turkey 
(a predominantly Muslim society), Christians and Jews were constrained 
in their rights through a system known as dhimmitude.248  A dhimmi 
(protected person) was a person who was not a Muslim, but was 
nonetheless protected from the jihad concept if they lent themselves to 
certain severe societal limitations.249  In line with this “protected” status, 
dhimmis could not bear arms, serve in the military, or openly practice 
any of their religious tenets, and were forced to wear certain clothing of 
certain color, barred from marrying Muslim women, barred from riding 
horses, limited in how they could build their homes and where they 
could live, and forced to pay a tax for “protection of the Islamic state.”250  
The punishments for violation of any of these limitations ranged from 
fines to imprisonment to death.251  One of the burgeoning reasons for the 
genocide itself was the non-Muslim Armenian population beginning to 
stir against these oppressive practices and their demand for equality in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.252  In that sense, the 
dhimmitude laws of Ottoman Turkey are not dissimilar to the 
Nuremberg laws in Nazi Germany because both denied basic civil rights 
of citizenship to native-born state subjects simply because of the 
subjects’ statuses as non-Muslims (in Ottoman Turkey) and non-Aryans 
(in Nazi Germany).  If such legal treatment in Nazi Germany of Jews 
leads to removal of the citizenship requirement for the taking claims of 
Jewish heirs for Nazi-era theft, then a similar result can necessarily be 
found in the case of Armenian heirs when property was taken from their 
 
248. BAT YE’OR, THE DHIMMI: JEWS AND CHRISTIANS UNDER ISLAM 54–67 (1985) 
(explaining the concept of dhimmi and the results of those Christians and Jews who were 
subject to dhimmitude). 
249. See James J. Reid, Total War, the Annihilation Ethic, and the Armenian Genocide, 
1870–1918, in THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE: HISTORY, POLITICS, ETHICS, supra note 2, at 21, 
26 (explaining that “Armenian, Greek, Nestorian, Syrian, and Coptic Christians living under 
Ottoman rule always held a dhimmi status, as did Ottoman Jews”). 
250. AKÇAM, supra note 91, at 22–25. 
251. Id. at 24. 
252. See id. at 24–25. 
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ancestors by the Ottoman Turkish Empire and whose legal status in 
Ottoman Turkey was akin to that of Jews in Nazi Germany. 
As such, an Armenian plaintiff has a claim similar to the plaintiff in 
Cassirer in that Armenians were not treated as citizens of Turkey during 
the time of the genocide, but were dhimmis, subservient to both the 
government and all Muslim citizens in almost every aspect of their daily 
lives.  As in Cassirer, an Armenian plaintiff would have to bolster his or 
her claims with factual specifics of the terms of dhimmitude in Ottoman 
Turkey, and relate such to a conclusion that non-Muslims were not 
citizens, but were separate and apart from the vast Muslim majority. 
C.  Suing Turkey and Its State-Owned Entities 
In the second half of 2010, the legal focuses were finally turned to 
the actual perpetrators when suits were filed in American courts against 
the Republic of Turkey, as successor of Ottoman Turkey, and two state-
owned banks: the Central Bank of Turkey and Ziraat Bank, a state-
owned commercial bank that is also the oldest bank in Turkey with 
origins going back to 1863.253 
The two suits were filed against these sovereign entities by two 
different sets of lawyers.  The first suit, Davoyan v. Republic of 
Turkey,254 was filed by plaintiff Garbis Davoyan, on behalf of 
beneficiaries of former Turkish citizens and their heirs, against the 
Turkish government whose successor is the Republic of Turkey.255  The 
suit claimed the Turkish government had deprived plaintiffs of 
citizenship, brutally deported the plaintiffs’ ancestors, and seized and 
expropriated the ancestors’ property.256  Further, the plaintiff in 
Davoyan claims that the defendant, the Republic of Turkey, is a 
legitimate successor of the predecessor government—the Ottoman 
Turkish Empire—and should be amenable to suit.257  As of this writing, 
the suit is in its initial stages, with the sovereign defendants yet to be 
served under the service of process provisions of FSIA. 
 
253. For information on Ziraat Bank’s New York branch, see T.C. ZIRAAT BANKASI 
A..: NEW YORK BRANCH, http://www.ziraatnewyork.com/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2011). 
254. Class Action Complaint and Jury Trial Demand, Davoyan v. Republic of Turkey 
¶ 1, No. 2:10-cv-05636-DMG-SS (C.D. Cal. July 29, 2010). 
255. Id.  This suit was filed by a team of lawyers headed by Kabateck and Geragos. 
256. Id. 
257. Id. 
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The second suit, Bakalian v. Republic of Turkey, also at the 
beginning stages at the time of this writing, was filed by plaintiff Alex 
Bakalian and others, and seeks fair market rents and rightful ownership 
of some 122.5 acres of property located in the Adana region of Turkey, 
taken from their ancestors during the Armenian Genocide.258  Today, 
this property is occupied by the Incirlik Air Force Base, which is used by 
the American military for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.259  The 
irony, of course, is that the United States is fighting wars to establish 
democracy and freedom in the region on land stolen during a genocide. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The above discussion regarding suing Turkey in American courts 
does not intend to create an impression that such a suit will necessarily 
succeed.  With the various procedural defenses available to Turkey and 
its agencies or instrumentalities, it is quite probable that such a suit 
could be dismissed on one or more of such defenses.  Nevertheless, 
when the Holocaust-era restitution suits were first filed in the late 1990s, 
an expert assessment of such suits would have predicted the same dismal 
result.  With the legal precedent established by the successes of the 
 
258. Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial ¶ 1, Bakalian v. Republic of Turkey, No. 
2:10-cv-09596-DMG-SS (C.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2010).  This suit was filed by a team of lawyers 
headed by Yeghiayan. 
259. For information about the Incirlik base, see U.S. AIR FORCE: INCIRLIK AIR BASE, 
http://www.incirlik.af.mil/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2011).  As the website explains,  
 
 Close to many of the world’s potential trouble spots, Incirlik Air Base is an 
important base in NATO’s Southern Region.  The mission of the host 39th Air Base 
Wing is to support and protect U.S. and NATO assets and people throughout 
Turkey while providing a full spectrum of capabilities to the warfighter. 
Welcome, U.S. AIR FORCE: INCIRLIK AIR BASE, http://www.incirlik.af.mil/main/welcome.asp 
(last visited Oct. 11, 2011).  Although the 39th Air Base Wing has no permanently-assigned 
U.S. Air Force aircraft, it provides excellent facilities and supports various training 
deployments and regional exercises, serves as a key communications link for National 
Command Authority tasks, and provides hub support for various units.  Id. 
 Interestingly, the website obliquely refers to the acts of genocide committed against the 
Armenians in the area: “In 1909 Adana was the site of what is termed the Adana massacre.  
Turkish scholars and some others refer to the event as the Adana rebellion based on a thesis 
of its underlying causes.”  Adana, Turkey, U.S. AIR FORCE: INCIRLIK AIR BASE (Nov. 22, 
2006), http://www.incirlik.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=5472; see also Rouben 
Paul Adalian, Adana Massacre, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GENOCIDE 47, 47 (Israel W. Charny 
ed., 2000) (“The Adana Massacre was the second series of large-scale massacres of 
Armenians to break out in the Ottoman Empire.  The atrocities committed in the province of 
Adana . . . [resulted in] an estimated 30,000 Armenians [being] killed.”). 
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Holocaust restitution litigation in the United States, and the decisions of 
the Armenian insurance and bank suits filed to date, the legal landscape 
for filing a suit against Turkey or one of its state-owned entities for acts 
arising out of the Armenian Genocide has never been more favorable. 
Keeping in mind, therefore, the unpredictable nature of litigation 
and its possible outcome, this Article is meant both to inspire and 
provide proper navigational guidance for those who endeavor to set off 
in uncharted American legal waters with the aim of providing a measure 
of justice for the heirs whose ancestors were victims of the first non-
colonial genocide of the modern era. 
